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ABSTRACT 
 This paper addresses two primary topics, South Asian epistemology and intellectual 
history. It focuses on the epistemological theory of intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) of 
cognition presented by the 7th century South Asian philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and presents an 
intellectual historical account of some developments in the history of pre-modern South Asian 
epistemology. It attempts to present a historical account of this theory in relation to its own 
intellectual milieu—i.e. in relation to the tradition to which Kumārila belonged—as well as in 
relation to its opponents—i.e. to the 10th century Kashmirian philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. 
Additionally, this paper is committed to the presupposition that innovation does not occur in a 
vacuum and that only by paying close attention to texts and textual traditions can we gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the developments in pre-modern South Asian thought and 
philosophical traditions in particular. 
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Both ignorant and faithless, the one who is disposed to doubt is utterly lost. 
Neither this world, the next, nor happiness exist for them.1  
—Bhagavad Gītā 
0. INTRODUCTION 
 Such a problematization of doubt serves as a religious admonition; the assertion is clear, 
an individual who is inclined to doubt is without both faith and knowledge and enjoys neither 
life, heaven, nor happiness. In part it seems that such a declaration is underpinned by the 
commitment that a lack of faith in conjunction with capricious doubt will effectively disqualify a 
particular individual from even the most basic of human aims, e.g. happiness. But how does 
South Asian philosophy address the concept doubt? More specifically, what status does doubt 
have and what, if any, purposes does it serve in South Asian epistemology? This paper attempts 
to provide an answer to these questions as well as present an historical account of some 
epistemological developments in South Asia. As will be shown at greater length later on, the 
epistemic mobilization of doubt plays in important role in the discursive engagements this paper 
discusses. It will be shown, contra the aforementioned admonition, that doubt plays an essential 
role in South Asian discussions of inquiry as such and even underlies, according to one of our 
theorists, our ordinary engagements with the world. At the most fundamental level it can be 
argued that the increased interest in the conceptualization as well as expanded domain of doubt is 
at the heart of what this paper attempts to discuss.  
Primarily this project is intellectual historical; it attempts to explain the development of a 
particular epistemological theory in its own philosophic tradition as well as its reception by a 
rival theorist. It takes as an essential presupposition the commitment that innovation does not 
occur in a vacuum and that by paying close attention to the commentarial and polemical 
                                                          
1. The translations of all primary material presented in this paper are my own unless otherwise noted. 
ajñaś cāśraddadhānaś ca saṃśayātmā vinaśyati / 
nāyaṃ loko ‘sti na paro na sukhaṃ saṃśayātmanaḥ // BhG 4.40. 
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traditions of Sanskrit texts we can gain more in-depth understanding of the intellectual climates 
which encouraged particular writers and their intellectual production. 
Using textual exchange—an expression that I use to cover commentarial, polemical and 
intra-traditional borrowing across texts—as a method to trace the development of philosophical 
thought is an essential part of my project. In part one of my paper the two texts under discussion 
are intra-traditional in character—i.e. they are both established in the same philosophic tradition 
while the second is an explicit commentary on the first—and are characterized by a commitment 
to certain fundamental assumptions and aims which include them in this tradition. In Part II the 
exchange is inter-traditional and expressly polemical. This section will examine the arguments 
established in Part I not as part of a single system but instead through another rival tradition. The 
last section will attempt to move beyond the domain inter-traditional polemical engagements and 
instead focus on mutual influence and borrowing, specifically in relation to Part II. It will take a 
wider scope and attempt to show that while intra-traditional exchange and intra-traditional 
polemics are valuable tools for assessing intellectual engagement in South Asia, ultimately the 
climate of a given author’s textual activity is underpinned by much more complicated social and 
cultural interactions. 
Broadly speaking my project focuses primarily on two traditions of South Asian 
philosophy: Mīmāṃsā, the tradition of Vedic interpretation or hermeneutics, and Nyāya, a 
prominent tradition of South Asian logic and epistemology.2 More specifically it will focus on 
the epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya) of cognition espoused by 
                                                          
2. By Vedic I simply mean the seminal corpus of South Asian brahmanical traditions and so what is 
frequently referred to as orthodox South Asian scripture. This body of literature is frequently discussed in opposition 
to the scriptural traditions of those who fall outside of the Vedic fold, e.g. Buddhist or Jain traditions, which is 
sometimes termed heterodox, although it seems this terminology is somewhat antiquated and does not seem to be 
used widely to discuss these terms today.  
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the 7th century Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, according to which the validity of every 
accurate awareness innately belongs to the awareness itself and so does not require external 
verification processes in order to justify belief in the awareness’ content. This discussion will be 
presented via an intra-traditional examination of Kumārila and his predecessors and pay 
particular attention to how pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā dealt with epistemological issues. Next it will 
address the critique and response to this epistemological theory levelled by the 9th century Nyāya 
philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. In this section I will discuss Jayanta’s inter-traditional response by 
examining how essential assumptions made by Kumārila are rejected and responded to by 
Jayanta. Lastly, I will look at how particular arguments formulated by Jayanta are influenced by 
other philosophic traditions. 
1. MĪMĀṂSĀ EPISTEMOLOGY 
1.1. Śabara & the Vṛttikāra on Mīmāṃsā Methodology & Epistemology    
In the past twenty odd years there has been sustained interest in the epistemology of 
Kumārila; primarily these publications have attempted to address his thought through his own 
text as explicated by one of three of its commentaries.3 While this methodology is commendable 
in many respects it also has the potential to yield a somewhat incomplete picture of Kumārila as 
a philosophical innovator in his tradition. Primarily this is due to the comparative lack of 
attention paid to the genre of Kumārila’s Critical Commentary in Verse (Ślokavārttika), the text 
                                                          
3. The primary publications I am referring to here are John Taber, “What Did Kumārila Mean By Svataḥ 
Prāmāṇya?” Journal of the American Oriental Society 112.2 (1992), Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: 
Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Elisa Freschi & 
Alessandro Graheli, “Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā and Nyāya on Veda and Tradition” in Boundaries, Dynamics and 
Construction of Traditions in South Asia, ed. by Federico Squarcini (London: Anthem Press, 2011)—esp. 310-
311.—and Lawrence McCrea, “Justification, Credibility and Truth: Sucaritamiśra on Kumārila's Intrinsic Validity.” 
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens/Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies (Forthcoming). The one 
significant exception to this is Freschi & Graheli 2010, which attempts to trace trends in the traditions of both 
Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya through a number of writers in each tradition but this study deals less explicitly with 
Kumārila’s epistemology but instead has other concerns. 
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in which the theory of intrinsic validity is formulated. The ŚV itself is framed as a commentary 
on a preexisting Mīmāṃsā text known as The Commentary on the Aphorisms of Mīmāṃsā 
(Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya) which provides the opportunity to look, not forward to Kumārila’s 
commentators for insight into the interpretation of the theory of intrinsic validity, but backwards 
for its foundations.4 That is to say, through the investigation of earlier Mīmāṃsā literature it is 
possible to assess and identify Kumārila’s sources as well as his putative innovations. Such an 
approach will yield a more robust understanding of the theory of intrinsic validity and of the 
historical developments in epistemology of the tradition itself.  
 Kumārila’s entire ŚV is a critical commentary on the first section (pāda) of the first 
chapter (adhyāya) of the MSBh, the only extant pre-Kumārila commentary on the Aphorisms of 
Mīmāṃsā (Mīmāṃsāsūtra), which is the foundational text of the tradition.5 The MSBh was 
written by the 5th century Mīmāṃsaka Śabara who systematically comments on the entire MS 
which is primarily concerned with scriptural interpretation.6 The first section of the first chapter 
of Śabara’s MSBh, referred to as the Section on Reasoning (tarka-pāda), serves as the 
philosophical preface to the tradition of scriptural interpretation as such and encompasses the 
most extensive philosophical discussions presented anywhere in the MSBh.7 For this reason the 
ŚV exhibits an analogous philosophical bent insofar as it is a commentary of precisely this 
section, i.e. on the tarka-pāda. While the critical genre in which Kumārila formulates his 
                                                          
4. It should be noted that Arnold does address the MSBh in his discussion as well but does not present an 
exhaustive enough picture of the state of epistemology pre-Kumārila in my opinion. Arnold, esp. 63-65. 
5. The tradition of sūtra texts is used to present concise memorizable tenets of a tradition and so consist of 
short declarations outlining the tenets and commitments of a given tradition. Thus the MS consists of short 
statements, i.e. sūtra, outlining the principles of exegesis it employs which are then commented upon by later 
members of the school.  
6. The word Mīmāṃsaka simply refers to a member of the tradition of Mīmāṃsā.   
7. McCrea, “The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mīmāṃsā Interpretive Theory,” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, 28.5 (2000): 430.  
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commentary does allow him more flexibility in his assessment of Śabara than other 
commentarial styles, it would be inaccurate to say that Kumarila dismisses Śabara entirely; the 
MSBh and its arguments stand prominently in the background of Kumārila’s text and the mere 
stylings of criticism should not be taken as being entirely dismissive of this earlier commentary.8 
With this fact in mind it remains to be seen where and how Kumārila is critical of Śabara and to 
what extent the MSBh can be seen as providing, if not the full-fledged epistemology that 
Kumārila will elaborate, at least the conceptual framework for it. For this reason close attention 
should be paid to the MSBh as an historical text, encapsulating its own concerns and antecedents, 
as well as to it as a moment in the trajectory of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. The section that follows 
will employ this method of investigation drawing attention to important trends in the tradition 
which are clearly instrumental in the development of Kumārila’s epistemology. Once the MSBh 
has been discussed, the topic of Kumārila’s own arguments will be taken up paying particular 
attention to where and to what extent they are influenced by this earlier commentary. 
 As previously mentioned the tradition of Mīmāṃsā is essentially exegetical in character, 
it attempts to establish a method of Vedic interpretation that will always yield accurate sacrificial 
instruction. In this respect the tradition is entangled from the very outset in epistemological 
concerns and the question of how to best account for the validity of Vedic testimony is an 
essential topic of the first section of the MSBh, i.e. of the tarka-pāda. But, as we shall see, two 
slightly different epistemological solutions to this problem are provided in the MSBh which 
presents the opportunity to approach each as a potential forerunner to the theory of intrinsic 
validity. Additionally, these epistemologies presuppose the articulation of a conceptual and 
                                                          
8. For example, it is said that a Critical Commentary (vārttika) should explain what is said (ukta), supply 
what is left out (anukta) and correct what is said poorly (durukta) in the text it comments upon. Vaman Shivaram 
Apte. The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Revised & Enlarged Edition (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 
2003), 1417.  
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methodological framework which can support them, which includes assumptions and conceptual 
commitments that span both the MSBh as well as the ŚV and inform many methods of 
argumentation in the tradition. This process begins with marked commitment to language as a 
means of communicating information. And is coupled, as John Taber has correctly pointed out, 
with a clear predilection toward a kind of anti-fideism or empiricism.9 The empiricist tendencies 
under consideration are most obviously disclosed in philosophic debate by Kumārila and are 
frequently reinforced by the dictum that things have always been as they are now.10 Thus, for 
Kumārila, this presupposition in conjunction with the fact that all valid means of knowledge 
(pramāṇas) are based on perception effectively entails that all people equally rely on sense 
experience in the formulation of their knowledge claims, if only indirectly in the case of 
inference, etc. More generally this tendency also features prominently in the style of 
argumentation and hermeneutic methodology pursued in pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā as well. This 
second point, while somewhat patently obvious from the text itself, has not yet been taken up 
with respect to early Mīmāṃsā epistemology. Once this empiricist methodology is taken 
seriously it is clear that the epistemology of the MSBh, which Kumārila takes as the basis for his 
argumentation, shares tendencies and presuppositions which are essential to the theory of 
intrinsic validity.  
 The assessment of epistemology and its conceptual framework in the MSBh will be 
presented through a close reading of the text; two sections will be assessed, one expressing the 
opinions of Śabara while the other represents the position of another commentator, referred to 
                                                          
9. Taber, 205. 
10. For a very good discussion of how these principles play out in other arguments formulated by Kumārila 
see McCrea ““Just Like Us, Just Like Now”: The Tactical Implications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic 
Perception” in Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness, edited by Eli Franco in 
collaboration with Dagmer Eigner. (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 55-70. 
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simply as the maker of the commentary (Vṛttikāra), whom Śabara paraphrases at length. It is 
interesting to note that this long excursus on the views of the Vṛttikāra provides the most 
consistently philosophical content found anywhere in the MSBh and that it is openly admitted to 
be the work of another writer. For this reason a distinction can be drawn between arguments 
found in Śabara and those found in the Vṛttikāra. Additionally, one can assume that any 
argument that is found in both sections was first presented in the Vṛttikāra, or at least in the 
tradition preceding Śabara, and so is borrowed from the Vṛttikāra. In the discussions that follow 
the opinions of these two thinkers will be addressed separately in order to make clear where and 
how potential influences on Kumārila are presented originally. 
 In order to firmly ground the discussion of the epistemology of the MSBh it is important 
to briefly outline the theory of intrinsic validity presented by Kumārila. The theory of intrinsic 
validity as formulated in the ŚV states that the validity of all accurate cognitions is intrinsic to 
them, i.e. it is not produced from some other factor external to the cognition. This epistemology 
effectively emphasizes validity such that it becomes the central function or inclination of 
cognition; it claims that for something to be an accurate cognition is for it to be valid. However, 
this theory has important implications for cognition in general since, according to Kumārila, 
one’s ability to invalidate or disprove a given cognition comes after the cognition has arisen and 
from things extrinsic to that cognition. Thus, while only accurate cognitions are intrinsically 
valid in reality we have no way of knowing whether a given awareness is invalid until it has been 
overturned and so there is no phenomenological difference between the way accurate and 
inaccurate cognitions appear to us. This forces one to accept at face value the validity of all 
cognitions as they are experienced. On this account even cognitions which are later overturned 
were intrinsically valid when they first arose, i.e. they are innocent until proven guilty, or at least 
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we were justified in believing that they were. As such, the theory reflects Kumārila’s, but also 
Mīmāṃsā’s, tendency to “adhere strictly to appearances” since it is claimed that it is our natural 
inclination to accept each cognition as it arises as if it were true, whether it turns out to be so or 
not.11 As I will argue this theory, as it is found in the MSBh, bears some similarity to the concept 
of presumptive justification presented by Nicholas Rescher and as such I will make some use of 
his discussions in what follows. Additionally, as I present Kumārila’s account of intrinsic 
validity, especially as it diverges from what precedes it, I will rely on some discussion of 
Michael Huemer’s presentation of phenomenal conservatism. While I will present some 
discussion of the similarity and divergence of the two texts at length later on it is important to 
keep in mind, as previously indicated, that it is the concern for Vedic authority which motivates 
the discussion of epistemology in Mīmāṃsā to begin with and it is in this respect that Śabara and 
the Vṛttikāra can first be seen propounding their epistemologies.  
 The principle task of Mīmāṃsā is the development of a set of interpretive principles 
which allow one to correctly approach and understand Vedic texts. Primarily what is at stake in 
these discussions is what is termed Vedic duty (dharma) which consists of proscriptions and 
prohibitions to perform certain, principally sacrificial, acts.12 Thus, Mīmāṃsā is concerned with 
dharma in terms of sacrificial and religious action which is proscribed by the Veda. Naturally the 
question arises what dharma actually is and how it can be ascertained by individuals and it is in 
this context that Śabara presents his epistemology. It should be stated at the outset that insofar as 
the topic under consideration is only dharma and not, for example, the observable world, the 
                                                          
11. Taber, 207. 
12. A prime example of the type of action or duty, i.e. dharma, that the Veda proscribes is the injunction 
that “one who desires heaven should sacrifice.” svargakāmo yajeta. Thus, Mīmāṃsakas understand that this 
statement prescribes the action of sacrifice for one who wants to reach heaven and the question of how we know that 
sacrifice leads to heaven is where epistemological considerations are undertaken.   
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project that Śabara presents does not provide a comprehensive epistemology but rather a 
somewhat restricted examination of the dharma and how it can be known. That is to say, Śabara 
and the Mīmāṃsakas who preceded him were concerned with a unique kind of action (dharma) 
that was exclusively presented in religious texts, i.e. Vedic scripture. Proceeding in the 
framework of South Asian epistemology, Śabara does not pursue the question of knowledge in 
the Western sense as justified true belief or some variant thereof but rather presents his argument 
through the discussion of the various valid means of knowledge (pramāṇas), which for the 
tradition of Mīmāṃsā include perception, inference, testimony, comparison, supposition and 
proof from non-existence. In accordance with this method of approaching epistemology Śabara 
begins his discussion by examining which pramāṇa is capable of presenting information about 
dharma.  
This discussion is officially undertaken following sūtra 1.1.3 of the MS which states that 
“the investigation of the means of knowing dharma” is to be initiated, but Śabara tips his hand 
on the issue early on in his discussion of sūtra 1.1.2.13 Śabara takes this as an opportunity to 
deny that dharma is amenable to inference, comparison, supposition or proof from non-existence 
stating: “nor are inference, comparison or supposition causes [of the knowledge of dharma] 
because of the fact that they are preceded by perception. Also there is no proof from non-
existence [for it].”14 In other words, the inability of the other pramāṇas to communicate dharma 
is purely based on the fact that they all presuppose perception for their function. But what about 
perception? Why does it fail to measure up to the task? The answer is stated in sūtra 1.1.4 which 
maintains that it is inadequate because perception is only capable of apprehending existing 
                                                          
13. MS in MD, 21.1. tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ. sūtra 1.1.3 
14. MSBh in MD, 22.5-6. pratyakṣapūrvakatvāc cānumānopamānārthāpattīnām apy akāraṇatvam. abhāvo 
'pi na asti. MSBh, 22. 
 
 
10 
 
entities.15 As Śabara assess this argument the difficulty lies in the character of dharma and he 
argues as follows: 
When there is an existing connection between the object of awareness and the 
sense faculty the awareness produced is perception. And [dharma] is a purpose to 
be accomplished which does not exist at the time of cognition. Additionally 
perception apprehends existing things and not that which does not yet exist. Thus 
perception is not a means [of knowing dharma]. [emphasis mine]16 
The argument here emphasizes the exceptional or unique character of dharma. Thus, since 
dharma does not exist at the time of action but rather is brought about by the correct 
performance of sacrificial duties it cannot be perceived when one hears or reads a particular 
Vedic proscription to perform a particular sacrifice. So the unique character of dharma places it 
firmly outside of the scope of perception according to Śabara. In light of this argument the 
inadequacy of inference etc., is clear insofar as none of them has the capacity to ascertain 
something outside of the domain of perception either. 
 It is important at this point to inquire why dharma is awarded such unique and restricted 
character. Indeed it appears that the status it is claimed to possess in the tradition is entirely 
unprecedented in actual experience and so is not justifiable using the usual Mīmāṃsā empiricist 
style of argumentation which will be discussed at length later on. However, the answer that can 
be provided from the tradition itself is assumptive in character. Firstly, it is claimed that no 
portion of a Vedic text can be useless and secondly, that, at least for the most part, the Veda is 
the only source of knowledge about dharma.17 Given this special character of dharma it remains 
to be seen how any pramāṇa could function with regard to it. According to Śabara it is only 
                                                          
 
15. MS in MD, 21.6-7. satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam, 
vidyamnānopalambhanatvāt. sūtra 1.1.4 
16. MSBh in MD, 21.8-22.3. sati indriyārthasaṃbandhe yā puruṣasya buddhir jāyate, tat pratyakṣam. 
bhavisyaṃś ca eṣo 'rtho na jñānakāle 'sti. sataś ca etad upalambhanaṃ, na asataḥ. ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam.  
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through language, or more specifically injunctive statements as communicated in the Veda, that 
knowledge about dharma can be ascertained. In commenting on sūtra 2, which reads “dharma is 
a purpose [conducive to the highest good] which is indicated by an injunction,” Śabara explains 
that an injunction (codanā) is an expression which impels one to engage in a particular action.18 
But does the claim that dharma is characterized by the injunction to perform particular actions 
amount to the assertion that the only pramāṇa capable of communicating dharma is injunctive 
statement? According to Śabara it does. In his discussion of the terms of the sūtra he glosses the 
word ‘indicated’ (lakṣaṇa) as follows: “a lakṣaṇa is the thing by which something is indicated. 
Since people say [with regard to an inference] that the smoke is the indicator of fire.”19 The 
comparison to inference is important here. Firstly, it establishes clearly how Śabara 
conceptualizes the role of injunctive language in the sūtra and secondly, it does so via an 
example which uses another pramāṇa. Śabara’s comparison of an injunction to the function of 
smoke as the indicator of fire in an inference solidifies the point that Śabara is trying to make; in 
the same way that the observation of smoke on a distant mountain warrants the inference that 
there is fire on that mountain an injunctive statement warrants the conclusion that the injunction 
pertains to dharma. Therefore, for Śabara the only pramāṇa suitable to the communication of 
dharma is testimony, or more specifically Vedic injunctions. Additionally, Śabara asserts that the 
unique character of dharma, namely that it is to be accomplished or brought into existence, is 
                                                          
17. MSBh in MD, 5.12-6.3. tad ucyate: atikramiṣyāma imam āmnāyam. anatikrāmanto vedam arthavantaṃ 
santam anarthakaṃ avakalpayema. dṛṣṭo hi tasya arthaḥ karmāvabodhanaṃ nāma. na ca tasya adhyayanamātrāt 
tatrabhavanto yājñikāḥ phalaṃ samāmananti. Also McCrea, “Hindu jurisprudence and scriptural hermeneutics,” In 
Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, edited by Donald Davis Jr., Jayanth Krishnan, and Timothy Lubin. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 124-125. 
18. MS & MSBh in MD, 11.4 & 12.1. codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ. sūtra 1.1.2 codanā iti kriyāyāḥ 
pravartakaṃ vacanam. 
19. MSBh in MD, 12.2-3. lakṣyate yena, tallakṣaṇam. dhūmo lakṣaṇam agner iti hi vadanti. 
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unproblematic when it comes to Vedic injunctions insofar as they are able to teach what is past, 
present and future, subtle, distant etc.20 That is to say, Vedic injunctions have the unique capacity 
to communicate information about those objects which perception, and therefore the other 
pramāṇas, cannot. It is important to note that Śabara and the other Mīmāṃsaka are aware of the 
inconsistent reliability of testimony in ordinary practice, but in the case of the Veda they argue 
that the text is both eternal and authorless and so provides no opportunity for the type of 
testimonial failure that ordinary testimony is susceptible to. Taking the foregoing discussion into 
account it appears that Śabara’s claim amounts to the assertion that dharma is a purpose which is 
ascertained through Vedic injunctions. 
 The role of injunctive language is of essential importance to a text whose sole purpose is 
the communication of ritual minutiae since in the tradition of Vedic sacrifice the strict details of 
how and when to perform a particular ritual are of the utmost importance. As it stands, and as 
previously mentioned, Mīmāṃsā theorists claim that the status of the Vedic texts in relation to 
dharma is exclusive in this regard; there is no other source for the knowledge of dharma and, as 
Śabara formulates the framework, this is guaranteed by the fact that the injunctive language of 
the Veda itself, as sub-branch of testimony, is the only pramāṇa for it. But the opponent asks: 
Isn’t it the case that an injunction could also relate a purpose which is not of such 
a kind [as previously mentioned]? As, for example, sometimes common 
expressions such as ‘there are fruits on the bank of the river,’ happen to be true 
while sometimes they are false.21  
That is to say, what safeguards Vedic injunctions from communicating purposes which are 
useless insofar as they are verbal expressions and verbal expression turnout to be wrong all the 
                                                          
20. MSBh in MD, 13.2-3. codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam 
ity evaṃjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknoty avagamayitum, nānyat kiṃcanendriyam. 
21. MSBh in MD, 13.4-5. nanv atathābhūtam apy arthaṃ brūyāc codanā, yathā yatkiṃcana laukikaṃ 
vacanaṃ nadyās tīre phalāni santi" iti. tat tathyam api bhavati, vitatham api bhavati iti. 
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time? Śabara’s response to this objection is worth taking some time to consider insofar as it is 
closely modeled on an argument that is formulated by the Vṛttikāra which will be discussed 
further on. Śabara responds as follows: 
It is said [by us]: the declaration, ‘[an injunction] both speaks and is false,’ is a 
contradiction. Since it is said ‘it speaks’ means it causes one to know, i.e. it 
becomes a means of knowledge for one engaged in the act of knowing. And if 
there is knowledge when a particular thing is a means of knowledge, that thing 
causes one to know. Moreover, when there is an injunction it is understood, 
‘heaven arises from the Agnihotra sacrifice,’ how is it said, ‘this is not so?’ And if 
it actually were not so, how could it become known? [The claim that] ‘a non-
existing object becomes known,’ is a contradiction.22 
The argument as it is presented here emphasizes the fact that a Vedic injunction produces 
awareness and for Śabara it seems to be implied that the very fact that an awareness is produced 
entails that there is knowledge. That is to say, Śabara maintains that the content of a Vedic 
injunction is determinate in character. When it is heard that someone desirous of heaven should 
sacrifice one does not, according to Śabara, suspect that heaven may not result from such a 
sacrifice and insofar as they do not, the awareness produced by the injunction is determinate and 
so cannot be wrong.23 But how can this claim possibly be substantiated? Since one could argue, 
in much the same way as the opponent already has, that this is no different from ordinary 
expressions. For example, it could reasonably be asserted that the awareness produced upon 
hearing the declaration “there are fruits on the river bank” possess the content “there are fruits on 
the riverbank.” Śabara’s response to this hinges on the status of what can be communicated in 
ordinary testimony and by the Veda.  
                                                          
22. MSBh in MD, 14.1-5. ucyate: vipratiṣiddham idam abhidhīyate "bravīti ca vitathaṃ ca" iti. bravīti ity 
ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati iti. yasmiṃś ca nimittabhūte saty avabudhyate, so 
'vabodhayati. yadi ca codanāyāṃ satyām "agnihotrāt svargo bhavati" ity avagamyate, katham ucyate na tathā 
bhavati" iti. atha na tathā bhavati, katham avabudhyate. asantam artham avabudhyata iti vipratiṣiddham. 
23. MSBh in MD, 15.1-3. na ca “śvargakāmo yajeta" ity ato vacanāt saṃdigdham avagamyate "bhavati vā 
svargo na vā bhavati" iti. na ca niścitam avagamyamānam idaṃ mithyā syāt. 
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As we have seen, the special character of dharma is that it is a purpose to be 
accomplished and so is not amenable to perception and the other pramāṇas but this is not the 
case where ordinary expressions are concerned. To begin with Śabara fundamentally rejects the 
possibility that common expressions of the type presented earlier produce determinate 
awareness. Rather, he states:  
The awareness produced from a human assertion possesses the content ‘this 
person considers it to be so and so’ and not ‘this thing actually is so and so.’ So 
some awarenesses produced from human assertions certainly go astray but there is 
no pramāṇa for the proof of the falsity of the Veda.”24  
From this argument it seems that the ontological status of dharma functions both positively and 
negatively. Through its character as a purpose to be accomplished it is effectively removed from 
the domain of perception both as something to be ascertained and to be disproved. Śabara 
bolsters this point with an observation that appears, once again, to be borrowed directly from the 
Vṛttikāra; he claims that the only awareness which is false is one that is produced and then 
destroyed by the thought that it is not accurate.25 But it seems that the picture is not complete. 
How does falsification actually function? Since it appears that without a strict theory of 
falsification in place Śabara’s account of how dharma is ascertained is rather inadequate.  
 In regard to how exactly falsification takes place Śabara is rather terse. Thus, whether this 
is because he does not care to get into the topic or whether he simply accepts the arguments of 
the Vṛttikāra, which are more detailed, is something that should be considered. Śabara 
recapitulates a more in-depth theory of falsification in the vṛttikāra-grantha, which is presented 
after Śabara’s commentary on sūtra 1.1.5, includes the Vṛttikāra’s alternate explanation of sūtras 
                                                          
24. MSBh in MD, 16.6-17.3 api ca pauruṣeyād vacanād "evam ayaṃ puruṣo veda" iti bhavati pratyayo, na 
"evam ayam artha" iti. viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayaḥ. na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve 
kiṃcana pramāṇam asti. 
25. MSBh in MD, 15.3. yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate “na etad evam" iti, sa mithyāpratyayaḥ. 
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3-5 and so also begins with epistemological considerations. Before presenting the Vṛttikāra’s 
account of invalidation and falsity it is important to examine how he begins his alternate 
explanation of this section. The Vṛttikāra explains, contra Śabara, that in fact the various 
pramāṇas do not need to be investigated insofar as they are already known.26 This assertion 
entails an understanding of the pramāṇas which seems to differ significantly from Śabara’s. For 
example, in responding to the objection that the pramāṇas do need to be investigated since 
people experience perceptual error the Vṛttikāra claims that accuracy is entailed by the term 
perception itself and so any awareness which deviates cannot have been perception as such. The 
Vṛttikāra explains “when there is contact of the sense faculties of an individual with the very 
[same] object that is the content of the cognition, an awareness arises and that awareness is true 
perception.”27 Thus, only accurate perception counts as perception on the Vṛttikāra’s account.  
This would seem to raise phenomenological issues insofar as erroneous awarenesses are 
frequently experienced as accurate. Thus, the opponent asks how this is understood in cases of 
perceptual error where the individual actually believes that what they are seeing is true? The 
answer is simple and familiar. If an erroneous awareness is being entertained as true it is the fact 
that it is overturned by another cognition which establishes its falsity.28 Additionally, there is a 
distinct difference between accurate and inaccurate awarenesses which pre-exists the occurrence 
of a blocking cognition on the Vṛttikāra’s account. The difference between accuracy and 
inaccuracy is as follows: 
When the mind is afflicted by things like hunger, or the sense faculties by things 
like eye disease, or the external object by such things as being very minute, then 
                                                          
26. MSBh in MD, 25.6-26.1. na parīkṣitavyaṃ nimittam. pratyakṣādīni hi prasiddhāni pramāṇāni 
tadantargataṃ ca śāstram. 
27. MSBh in MD, 26.7-27.1. yadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ, tenaiva saṃprayoge indriyāṇāṃ puruṣasya buddhijanma 
sat pratyakṣam. 
28. MSBh in MD, 27.5-6. bādhakaṃ hi yatra jñānam utpadyate na etad evaṃ, mithyājñānam idam " iti. 
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the cognition is false. But, there is accurate cognition when there are no 
perceptual impediments, because the cause of cognition is the contact of the 
object, the mind, and the sense faculties.29 
Thus on the Vṛttikāra’s account of awareness the validity that results from a particular cognitive 
event is simply the representation of the object as such and it is only through defects or 
impediments that false awareness results. Here the Vṛttikāra outlines an important point about 
the presence and categorization of defects which Kumārila picks up on. Namely, he emphasizes 
that defects are both internal since they can belong to the knower and external since they can 
belong to the object or external world in some way. Therefore, sometimes mistaken awarenesses 
are produced because of errors in the perceptual apparatus while other times they are the result of 
the object or external factors such as insufficient light, etc.  But how is the absence of defects 
ascertained on this account? The Vṛttikāra’s response is distinctive and, as I will argue, provides 
some insight into Śabara’s discussion of injunctive language. As he describes it: 
If carefully searching for a defect we do not perceive one we should think ‘there 
is no defect because there is no means for acquiring one.’ Thus, only that 
awareness is incorrect, whose cause is defective on the one hand and where there 
is the idea “this is false” on the other; no other. [emphasis mine]30 
Such an explanation of how cognitive events take place is fundamental to a clear understanding 
of the background to Kumārila’s theory of intrinsic validity and as such resembles the model of 
presumptive justification as outlined by Nicholas Rescher. For Rescher, presumptive justification 
“does not proceed through the evidential meditation of previously justified grounds but directly 
and immediately” and such presumption simply requires that there be no standing rationally 
justified reason against it.31 As such, we experience a certain phenomenon and assent to its 
                                                          
29. MSBh in MD, 27.8-28.1. yadā kṣudādibhir upahataṃ mano bhavati, indriyaṃ vā timirādibhiḥ, 
saukṣmyādibhir vā bāhyo viṣayas, tato mithyājñānam, anupahateṣu saṃyagjñānam. indriyamanorthasaṃnikarṣo hi 
jñānasya hetuḥ. 
30. MSBh in MD, 28.4-6. prayatnena anvicchanto na ced doṣam upalabhemahi, pramāṇābhāvād aduṣṭam iti 
manyemahi. tasmād yasya ca duṣṭaṃ karaṇaṃ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa eva asamīcīnaḥ pratyayo nānya iti. 
31. Nicholas Reshcer, Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Albany: State 
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probative force almost immediately and as long as the resulting belief is not contradicted we are 
presumptively justified in holding it. Or as Rescher says: 
When, after a careful look, I am under the impression that there is a cat on the 
mat, I can (quite appropriately) base my acceptance of the contention “There is a 
cat on the mat” not on certain pre-established premisses, but simply on my 
experience—on my visual impression. [emphasis mine]32 
The emphasis on direct visual impressions is striking and the importance of similar intuitions in 
Mīmāṃsā cannot be overstated. Additionally, Rescher’s concern for perceptual diligence in the 
belief forming process is directly represented in the Vṛttikāra’s formulation. That is to say, one is 
not presumptively justified in their beliefs until at least some investigation of the situation is 
undertaken. On both accounts one must simply not have any rational reason to suspect that the 
belief one forms is false and until that belief is contradicted or overturned it is presumptively 
justified.  
The Vṛttikāra’s analysis of validation, as I have already claimed, also provides insight 
into Śabara’s assertions regarding falsification. Since it is through this scheme that Śabara’s 
claim, “that the awareness is false which having arisen is destroyed by the notion ‘this is not 
so,’” makes sense. On the Vṛttikāra’s account, the exceptional character of the Veda is that it 
cannot conceivably be disproven by anything since he will argue that its cause is not defective 
and it can never be overturned.33 The claim that the Veda cannot be false is supported by the 
assertion that the relation between words and their meanings for the Vṛttikāra is authorless which 
he explains as follows: 
If it were the case that the relation of words with their meaning were authored one 
could expect the falsity of the awareness they produce because then the cognition 
                                                          
University of New York Press, 2003), 94.  
32. Ibid, 86.  
33. Admittedly, some of these points are made by Śabara in his commentary on sūtra 5 but there also he 
fails to provide any argument over and above the sūtra for his claim that the Veda is never seen to be false.  
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would be in need of something else for its truth. But, when words speak, how is 
the cognition they produces false? Since then the awareness produced by the 
words does not come down from another person. With regard to the claim "the 
word speaks" it is said, "it causes one to know, i.e. it becomes the cause of 
understanding." And when word is the cause one knows by one’s self.34  
This argument provides an account of ordinary testimony which requires corroboration for its 
truth. Insofar as ordinary testimony is not accepted as true always and without exception there 
must be some means, outside of testimony itself, to validate a given assertion. But, as the 
Vṛttikāra explains, this is not so when it comes to the Veda since the relation between what it 
communicates, i.e. dharma, and the means of its communication, i.e. language, is already and 
always established and was not authored by any individual. For this reason the Vṛttikāra asserts 
that knowledge of dharma can be established by the Veda alone. The Vṛttikāra is here espousing 
an epistemological precursor to the theory of intrinsic validity insofar as, on the Vṛttikāra’s 
account, we are justified in thinking that there are no defects in a given cognition until we have 
reason to suspect them. Importantly this does not guarantee that we are not mistaken. However, 
the Veda does not function in this way. Instead the Vṛttikāra maintains that it is the fact that there 
is no means of disproving it which makes it intrinsically valid, i.e. because one could never 
cognize defects with regard to it and the awareness that it is false never arises. This method of 
Vedic validation attempts to provide “gap-filler for the informational void,” it is a presumption 
“that remains in place until something better comes along.”35 That is to say, it takes dharma as a 
topic for which some knowledge is required and presents an account of it which is presumptively 
justified.  
                                                          
34. ŚBh, 34.17-21. pauruṣeye hi sati sambandhe yaḥ pratyayaḥ, tasya mithyābhāva āśaṅkyeta. parapratyayo 
hi tadā syāt. atha śabde bruvati kathaṃ mithyeti? na hi tadānīm anyataḥ puruṣād avagamaḥ. "bravīti" ity ucyate 
"avabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittam bhavati" iti. śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate.  
35. Rescher, 81.  
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Śabara presents a similar argument, as previously discussed, concerning the Veda’s 
veridical nature but there is some difference between the way this is accounted for by Śabara and 
the Vṛttikāra. Importantly, Śabara does not assert that the relation between words and their 
meanings is authorless, instead he claims that it is natural.36 Thus, the dichotomy between 
authored and authorless testimony is not included in his account of the testimonial accuracy of 
the Veda. Rather he seems to claim, as already noted, that the simple fact that a Vedic injunction 
causes knowledge is evidence that it cannot be false. As it stands the method used to account for 
the Veda as a pramāṇa is instrumental to our understanding of Kumārila’s theory of intrinsic 
validity as well as pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā epistemology.  
The argument for Vedic injunctions is clearly underpinned by a division of testimony 
which is a point clearly stated by Śabara in the following explication of his argument. After 
presenting his account of Vedic testimony Śabara discusses ordinary testimony in opposition to 
the Veda. And he says: 
As for an ordinary assertion, it is only accurate if it is heard from a trustworthy 
person or has a content which is amenable to the senses. But, if it is heard from a 
untrustworthy person or does not have a content which is amenable to the senses, 
that assertion which is the cause of the cognition of the individual who heard it is 
not a pramāṇa. For, its [content] is unable to be known by an individual, except 
from a sentence itself. [emphasis mine]37 
Śabara’s emphasis on the role of perception in validating testimony should not be unfamiliar. As 
we have already seen Śabara clearly states the other pramāṇas, besides testimony, are founded 
on perception. Additionally, the Vṛttikāra makes the same claim but more explicitly. Namely, 
                                                          
36. MSBh in MD, 23.3. autpattika iti nityaṃ brūmaḥ. 
37. Importantly Kumārila criticizes this assertion and claims that it should be taken non-disjunctively so 
that ordinary assertions require a trustworthy person and a content which is amenable to the senses for their validity. 
ŚBh, 18.3-6. yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ, tac cet pratyayitāt puruṣād indriyaviṣayaṃ vā, avitatham eva tat. atha 
apratyayitāt puruṣād anindriyaviṣayaṃ vā, tat puruṣabuddhiprabhavam apramāṇam. aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum 
ṛte vacanāt. 
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that “the means of acquiring accurate knowledge, such as perception and so forth, are well 
known, and instruction (śāstra) is included in that group.”38 This tendency is indicative of 
Mīmāṃsā empiricist methodology broadly speaking and the primary aim here is to explicate how 
assertions are judged in everyday contexts and to emphasize our capacity and inclination to 
assess such assertions directly and empirically. Just how a particular writer in the tradition makes 
use of this methodology is important for understanding how her or his epistemology functions. 
As we have already seen, both Śabara and the Vṛttikāra primarily us the exceptional status of the 
Veda and dharma to substantiate their accounts of the Veda, but I will argue that the 
mobilization of empiricist methodology is an essential precursor to the theory of intrinsic 
validity.  
In order to show this increased utilization of empiricism it will be useful to look at a few 
instances in which a kind of empiricist methodology is employed in Śabara and the Vṛttikāra. To 
begin with Śabara’s comments on sūtra 1 provide a good introduction to how empiricism is 
employed throughout his text. In discussing the general tenets of interpreting the MS as well as 
Vedic language, Śabara claims that: 
Words are well known to have particular meanings in worldly discourse and when 
appearing in the sūtras those very same meanings should be understood. And 
these words’ meanings should not be assumed by supplying elliptical language or 
be defined in some technical sense. In this way Vedic statements alone are to be 
explained by this method. Otherwise both Vedic statements as well as the sūtra’s 
own words would have to be explained, which would result in excessive effort.39 
                                                          
38. Here śāstra is the Vṛttikāra’s testimonial pramāṇa, or at least that is how I take it. Whether this implies 
that he does not believe that ordinary testimony (śabda) is a pramāṇa or that he simply doesn’t explicitly state it is 
unclear but at the very least it does not seem to be what he is concerned with. MSBh in MD, 25.6-26.1. pratyakṣādīni 
hi prasiddhāni pramāṇāni tadantargataṃ ca śāstram. 
39. ŚBh, 10.3-7. loke yeṣv artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni, tāni sati saṃbhave tadarthāni eva sūtreṣv iti 
avagantavyam. na adhyāhārādibhir eṣāṃ parikalpanīyo 'rthaḥ paribhāṣitavyo vā. evaṃ hi vedavākyāny eva ebhir 
vyākhyāyante. itarathā vedavākyāni vyākhyeyāni svapadārthāś ca vyākhyeyāḥ. tad yatnagauravaṃ prasajyeta. 
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Such an interpretive declaration is not patently empiricist but does provide some insight into 
Mīmāṃsā methodology broadly speaking. It involves two essential commitments in Mīmāṃsā 
methodology. Firstly, it illustrates the Mīmāṃsā concept of what I will call a practical version of 
the principle of economy of hypothesis (kalpanā-lāghava). This principle dictates that if 
postulation is necessary to account for some phenomenon one should avoid, as far as possible, 
the postulation of unseen entities.40 The practical version of the principle simply explicates the 
superiority of simplicity over complexity in method, i.e. that if it is possible to account for the 
language of the sūtras by appealing to accepted usage one should not attempt to do so using 
other more complicated techniques. The argument states that what we see in the world, as far as 
common expressions are concerned, should dictate the parameters of interpretation for both the 
MS as well as the Veda.41 A similar claims is explicitly appealed to by Rescher in his discussion 
of the assumptions underlying the function of presumptive justification. Among other points he 
emphasizes that: 
The concept of simplicity affords a crucial entry point for plausibility 
considerations. The injunction “Other things being anything like equal, give 
precedence to simpler hypotheses over complex ones” can reasonably be 
espoused as a procedural, regulative principle of presumption.42  
That is to say, that between a simple and complex solution one can plausibly claim that the 
simpler is preferable and more likely to accord with the actual state of affairs. This brings to light 
the second trend, which clearly shows Śabara’s conceptual reliance on the observable world 
which I will argue is constitutive of Mīmāṃsā in general and is instrumental in the development 
of the theory of intrinsic validity specifically. Most frequently this trend is deployed 
                                                          
40. McCrea, “The Hierarchical Organization of Language in Mīmāṃsā Interpretive Theory,” 447-448. 
41. Govinda V. Devasthali, Mīmāṃsā: The Ancient Science of Sentence Interpretation (Bombay: 1959; 
reprint, Delhi: Sri Satguru, 2011), 1. 
42. Rescher 88.  
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comparatively, that is to say when entertaining a particular objection or formulating an argument, 
the empirical world is often addressed comparatively as a means to reject or maintain a particular 
assertion. 
 This tendency is explicitly entailed in the series of arguments employed throughout the 
vṛttikāra-grantha. Principally this can be explained through the Vṛttikāra’s formulation of a kind 
of empiricism as it functions for Mīmāṃsā. As emphasized throughout his discussions, the 
observable world is the foundational basis from which arguments should be explicated as well as 
analyzed. This is evident through his declaration that “for [Mīmāṃsā] observation is always a 
pramāṇa.”43 This principle firmly grounds the Vṛttikāra’s mode of argumentation in sensory 
input for the formulation of his epistemology and basic method of argumentation. Even the 
hierarchy of pramāṇas implicit in the Vṛttikāra’s comments on disagreement between pramāṇas 
favors perception as the foundational source of knowledge.44 It is important to note that in the 
case of epistemology this reliance on the world of appearances does not take on a rigorous form 
in which every awareness must be perceptually investigated and corroborated but rather takes the 
awareness, more or less, at face value.  
1.2. Kumārila’s Theory of Intrinsic Validity 
 The emphasis on empiricism is not restricted to the MSBh and its philosophical 
engagements and as Kumārila presents the full-fledged theory of intrinsic validity it is clear that 
his arguments also presuppose this empirical foundation. While Kumārila’s strict articulation of 
the theory will be discussed at length shortly it is important to first point out how Kumārila 
addresses the question of validity to begin with. Firstly, as Rescher has discussed, one tendency 
                                                          
43. MSBh in MD, 44.2. sarvatra no darśanaṃ pramāṇam. 
44. MSBh in MD, 56.9. na ca pratyakṣe pratyarthini kalpanā sādhvī. 
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in an epistemological theory which is concerned with presumptive justification is to rely on a 
‘this-or-nothing’ outlook on knowledge. That “if we want answers to factual questions, we have 
no real alternative but to trust in the cognitively cooperative disposition of the natural order of 
things.”45 As I will argue, Kumārila’s epistemology should be differentiated from his 
predecessors and their presentation of presumptive justification in some important ways. Unlike 
Śabara and the Vṛttikāra, who principally seem to present a theory of intrinsic validity which is, 
at least in some respects, comparatively careful and diligent, Kumārila attempts to present an 
epistemology which effaces the need for such care and instead champions the justificatory force 
of our experiences sans the Vṛttikāra’s careful search for defects. That is to say, Kumārila can be 
seen presenting an epistemology which is similar to the presumptive account that preceded him 
but with some important modifications. For this reason I choose to read Kumārila’s later, more 
robust, version of intrinsic validity not as an account of presumptive justification but as 
consonant with Michael Huemer’s theory of phenomenal conservatism which also concerns itself 
with justification but somewhat differently than what we have seen so far. It is important to note 
at the outset that Kumārila, like Huemer, believes that his epistemological account of our 
ordinary epistemic practices is constitutive of all epistemology and so provides the only account 
which is available to us for describing how we form belief and ultimately arrive at knowledge.46 
For this reason it is important to emphasize the negative character of Kumārila’s epistemological 
argument for intrinsic validity at the outset. 
                                                          
45. Rescher, 96.  
46. Interestingly, as I see it, the two writers address this issue in somewhat different terms. As we shall see 
Kumārila will attempt to demonstrate that all other epistemic accounts fail to escape some form of epistemic regress. 
However, Huemer attempts to do so by showing that all epistemological accounts which do not accept phenomenal 
conservatism are self-defeating since phenomenal conservatism is the only viable option for describing how 
appearances confer justification on our beliefs. “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservativism.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 74 (2007): 31. 
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 From the very outset of Kumārila’s discussion of epistemology in the ŚV it is quite clear 
that he is attempting to be theoretically exhaustive as well as negative in his arguments. As 
Kumārila outlines the problematic he hopes to address, which represents a rather different 
approach to epistemology when compared to previous discussions of the subject, he emphasizes 
that what is under consideration is the question “are the validity and the invalidity [of a 
cognition] intrinsic or else extrinsic?”47 From this inquiry Kumārila provides an exhaustive 
outline of what he perceives as the potential options for answering this question: either both 
validity and invalidity are intrinsic, they are both extrinsic, validity is extrinsic while invalidity is 
intrinsic, or validity is intrinsic while invalidity is extrinsic. From this framework Kumārila 
presents each in turn pointing out where they fail in their account of epistemology. It is important 
to note that Kumārila does not present the theory of intrinsic validity as the best option out of the 
four but rather as the only possible option to resolve the dilemma. The first two positions are 
allowed to be dispensed with in the voice of the primary opponent of intrinsic validity, namely 
the upholder of the theory that invalidity is intrinsic while validity is extrinsic.48  Verse 34 reads 
as follows: 
Some say both [validity and invalidity] are intrinsic because things which do not 
independently exist cannot be brought about. Others [say the opposite] because 
validity and invalidity are ascertained from good qualities and defects produced 
from their causes [respectively].49 
This verse provides the two reasons for claiming that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic 
and that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic with regard to a particular cognition. The first 
                                                          
47. ŚV, 79. pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ kiṃ parato 'tha vā / verse 33cd. 
48. It is interesting to note that when Jayanta later refutes this theory he does not present this theory as 
being the primary opponent of Kumarila but rather represents his own theory, i.e. that both validity and invalidity 
are extrinsic, as being Kumārila’s primary opponent. 
49. ŚV, 80-82. svato 'satām asādhyatvāt ke cid āhur dvayaṃ svataḥ / 
                apare kāraṇotpannaguṇadoṣāvadhāraṇāt // verse 34. 
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argument claims that validity and invalidity do not exist by themselves but only as attributes of 
existing awarenesses and so cannot be produced while the second claims that validity and 
invalidity are produced from good qualities or defects in the cause of the awareness and so are 
extrinsic to the cognition. The opponent rejects both these claims stating: 
To begin with both [validity and invalidity] are not intrinsically existent because 
of contradiction [between them] and they both are not extrinsic since then there 
would be the unwanted result that the form of the awareness would be without 
any character. 
Since, [on the first view] how is it possible for something which does not depend 
on anything else to have a character which is self-contradictory. And [on the 
second view] what character could that [cognition] have other than the character 
of those two (i.e. either validity or invalidity).50 
The argument as presented here is quite simple and relies on the assumption that something must 
have a character and that it cannot be contradictory, e.g. a cognition cannot be both valid and 
invalid at the same time. However, one could argue that validity and invalidity both belong to 
cognition as such but not to one and the same cognition so that the intrinsic nature of both could 
be maintained without self-contradiction. But according to the opponent this also is insufficient 
insofar as there would be no way to determine an invalid cognition from a valid one insofar as 
they are totally independent.51 Thus the only viable options that can be resorted to are that 
validity is extrinsic while invalidity is intrinsic or vice versa.  
 As it stands Kumārila implicitly accepts the arguments just put forward and the only 
move left to Kumārila is to show how and why our cognitive enterprise cannot be explained by 
the theory of extrinsic and validity intrinsic invalidity. To quote the opponent: 
Therefore let it be accepted that the cognition’s invalidity is inherent and that its 
                                                          
50. ŚV, 83-84. svatas tāvad dvayaṃ nāsti virodhāt parato na ca / 
                niḥsvabhāvatvam evaṃ hi jñānarūpe prasajyate // 
                kathaṃ hy anyānapekṣasya viparītātmasambhavaḥ / 
                kimātmakaṃ bhavet tac ca svabhāvadvayavarjitam // verses 35-36. 
51. ŚV, 84-85. vijñānavyaktibhedena bhavec ced aviruddhatā / 
                tathāpy anyānapekṣatve kiṃ kveti na nirūpyate // verse 37.  
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validity depends on something else. The reason [for this assertion] is stated: 
because invalidity is not an actual thing it cannot [arise] from defects in the cause 
but since validity is an actual thing it is produced by the good qualities in the 
cause.52 
The argument proceeds from an ontological position concerning the status of invalidity and 
validity respectively. On this view invalidity is not an attribute at all but rather an absence. An 
invalid cognition is not one that has arisen from defects in the perceptual apparatus etc., but 
rather the mere absence of good qualities which establish its accuracy in a positive sense. 
Kumārila asserts, however, that such an account of our cognitive enterprise would clearly lead to 
an epistemic regress. He explains that on this account the ascertainment of the object, through a 
cognitive event, depends on the cognition of good quality in the cause and that the cognition of 
these good qualities cannot be carried out by the first cognition. Thus, the cognition of good 
quality of the cause requires another pramāṇa which in turn produces another cognition from yet 
another cause. This perpetual validation would then lead to an infinite cycle of cognition and so 
is not tenable. Additionally, the accuracy of each following cognition would then rely on the 
accuracy of the cognitions which preceded it.53 It seems possible that Kumārila is committing 
what William Alston calls a level-confusion here insofar the fact that a cognition’s validity 
depends on good qualities in the cause should not be confused with higher-level epistemic claim 
that we must know or be able to relate how this dependence functions. Thus, it could be argued 
that Kumārila seems to be committed to a confusion about how mediate justification functions in 
                                                          
52. ŚV, 85-87. tasmāt svābhāvikaṃ teṣām apramāṇatvam iṣyatām / 
                       prāmāṇyam ca parāpekṣam atra nyāyo 'bhidhīyate // 
                       aprāmāṇyam avastutvān na syāt kāraṇadoṣataḥ / 
                       vastutvāt tu guṇais teṣāṃ prāmāṇyam upajanyate // verses 38-39. 
53. ŚV, 90-91. jāte 'pi yadi vijñāne tāvan nārtho 'vadhāryate / 
                yāvat kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ na pramāṇāntarād bhavet // 
                tatra jñānāntarotpādaḥ pratīkṣyaḥ kāraṇāntarāt / 
                   yāvad dhi na paricchinnā śuddhis tāvad asatsamā // verses 49-50.                                                                  
also Kei Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Part 2. An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-
Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra) (Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2011), 126.  
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ordinary practices and so mistakenly claims that a given knower must be able to always provide 
evidence for a given belief which is extraneous to that knowledge if one accepts the opponents 
position.54 In assessing this difficulty it is important to note the style of Kumārila’s presentation 
once more. While the genre of Kumārila’s text presents some interesting opportunities for 
comparative analysis insofar as it is a commentary on an earlier text. It also, however, presents 
some difficulty when addressing what is not found in the commentaries which preceded 
Kumārila. Kumārila’s rather terse style in this case effectively obscures just how he conceives of 
the kind of regress he presents and thus it is very difficult to address how appropriate it might be 
to charge Kumārila with committing a level-confusion. In effect it is precisely this type of 
innovation which often requires the elaboration of Kumārila’s commentators to shed some light 
on the issue. Which cannot be addressed here. Let it suffice to say that it is not clear that 
Kumārila does not conceive of some way in which this difficulty can be resolved, e.g. by 
connecting the two levels in some way. Nevertheless, with all this in mind it is interesting to note 
that this argument seems to be the only, or at least the primary, argument Kumārila deems 
necessary to refute the theory of extrinsic validity, leaving only option four, that validity is 
intrinsic while invalidity is extrinsic. 
 Kumārila’s method of argument as outlined so far is rather negative in character but it 
results in an epistemological account which allows individuals to avoid an epistemic regress as 
he sees it while also maintaining the possibility of knowledge in some respect. As already 
mentioned this clears the way for his presentation of intrinsic validity as a form of phenomenal 
                                                          
54. For example, Alston explains that if someone states the restriction for mediate justification that “if S’s 
belief that q is to constitute an adequate basis for S’s belief that p, not only must q be appropriately related to p, but 
S must know, or at least justifiably believe, that this is so,” then they are committing a level-confusion. “Level-
Confusions in Epistemology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5.1 (1980): 143. For mediate justificatory level-
confusions see esp. 143-145.   
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conservatism. Kumārila begins his theory as follows: 
Let it be understood that the validity of all accurate cognitions is intrinsic, since a 
capacity which does not exist innately cannot be produced by something else. For, 
let things depend on causes for their origination but once they have attained 
themselves they function totally independently in their own functions.55 
The claim here is that validity is a capacity of accurate cognitions as such and so it is their 
natural inclination to present things validly. Additionally, Kumārila claims that things, the classic 
example being a pot, require causes, e.g. a potter, clay, etc., for their production but no longer 
require their cause when they are used for any of their various functions, e.g. to carry water. 
Taking accurate cognition as the example, presumably Kumārila is claiming that it is clear that 
the cognition should require a sense faculty, object, etc., for its production but that once it has 
arisen it presents its content independently, intrinsically. It is in the context of this assertion that 
it becomes clear just how Kumārila effectively removes his theory of intrinsic validity from a 
larger epistemic framework which preceded him. The question of how the Veda and intrinsic 
validity relate to the larger epistemic framework is a difficulty which has already been presented 
in the case of the MSBh and as I will argue, the Vṛttikāra’s inability to remove his version of 
intrinsic validity form the wider epistemic framework is what ultimately leads Kumārila to 
articulate his more robust epistemology wherein intrinsic validity does not need to be articulated 
in terms of truth but rather is itself as close as we can get to truth in Kumārila’s opinion. Thus the 
role of intrinsic validity is markedly different in these two writers. While the Vṛttikāra’s, and to 
some extent Śabara’s, articulation can be viewed as an account of presumptive justification used 
as an epistemic ‘stop-gap’ or ‘filler’ meant to account for a circumscribed domain, i.e. Vedic 
                                                          
55. ŚV, 89-90. svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām / 
                na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate // 
               ātmalābhe ca bhāvānāṃ kāraṇāpekṣatā bhavet / 
                labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu // verses 47-48. 
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dharma, which cannot be accounted for otherwise, Kumārila’s theory represents a more nuanced 
claim about the nature of cognitive appearances which applies to the entire domain of 
knowledge, as already stressed. 
 By attempting to destabilize all other methods of accounting for the validity and 
invalidity of cognition Kumārila sees himself being left with one plausible account of the 
process, i.e. that all valid cognitions are intrinsically valid. This theory effectively, according to 
Kumārila, avoids every difficulty involved in the other epistemic accounts, perhaps the most 
pernicious being the epistemic regress. In explaining how intrinsic validity secures epistemic 
stability Kumārila says: 
When validity is intrinsic then nothing else whatsoever is sought after.               
For, falsity ceases effortlessly because there is no cognition of defects.56 
This argument should bring to mind what the Vṛttikāra already stressed in the MSBh, namely, 
that if we have a cognition and do not perceive any defects in the cause etc., we can conclude 
that there are no defects. Importantly, it seems, Kumārila does not emphasize the active search 
for defects for a given cognition. Instead he explains that if we have a cognition and do not 
perceive defects upon its origination the cognition is true, i.e. that doubting too must be 
justified.57 I take Kumārila’s lack of interest in perceptual care or diligence as one important 
indication of his divergence from his predecessors and which provides some evidence for reading 
Kumārila’s epistemology as being consonant with Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism. For 
example, as we have already seen both the Vṛttikāra and Rescher state that the careful search for 
                                                          
56. ŚV, 91. yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ tadānyan naiva gṛhyate / 
           nivarttate hi mithyātvaṃ doṣājñānād ayatnataḥ // verse 52. 
57. ŚV, 95. doṣajñāne tv anutpanne na śaṅkyā niṣpramāṇatā // verse 60cd. 
As I will discuss at length later on I take Kumarla’s lack of interest in the search for defects as one important shift in 
his articulation of the theory of intrinsic validity which I believe brings it in line with Huemer’s phenomenal 
conservatism. 
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defects is one important precursor to presumptively justificatory accounts of epistemology while, 
I would argue, both Kumārila and Huemer agree that the requirement of perceptual care “would 
provide a basis for discriminating against perceptual experience only if for some reason, we were 
unable to or universally failed to exercise adequate care in making perceptual judgments” which 
neither writer endorses.58[emphasis mine] The idea is that the natural capacity of our perceptual 
apparatuses, and our bodily mechanisms in general, tend to do their job without such restrictions 
to begin with. Thus, since the resting state of our awarenesses tends to present things as they are 
we are justified in assenting to their contents.  
In conjunction with this intuition Kumārila claims that cognitive corroboration is not 
necessary for the validation of any awareness. The fact that perception is a pramāṇa indicates 
that it is able to produce an ascertainment of its object by itself.59 Therefore, only one cognition 
is required for the accurate communication of its object, others may arise which present the same 
content but these additional awarenesses in no way add to the original cognitions validity and so 
are basically pointless reiterations.60 Thus, awareness is valid by its very nature and it is only 
susceptible to doubt if defects are cognized. And Kumārila explains those defects as follows: 
Therefore, the validity of an awareness which obtains from the fact that it is an 
awareness is [only] cancelled through the cognition of a defect in the cause or 
[through the cognition] that the object is otherwise. 61 
                                                          
58. Michael Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservativism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 74 (2007): 34.  
59. ŚV, 99-103. Verses 71-81 esp. 73  
     ŚV, 100. anyasyāpi pramāṇatve saṅgatir naiva kāraṇam / 
           tulyārthānāṃ vikalpyatvād ekaṃ tatra hi bodhakam // verse 73.  
60. ŚV, 104. pramāṇaṃ grahaṇāt pūrvaṃ svarūpeṇaiva saṃsthitam / 
             nirapekṣaṃ svakāryeṣu gṛhyate pratyayāntaraiḥ //  
             tenāsya jñāyamānatvaṃ prāmāṇye nopayujyate / 
             viṣayānubhavo hy atra pūrvasmād eva labhyate // verses 83-84. 
61. ŚV, 91-92. tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā / 
                arthānyathātvahetūtthadoṣajñānād apodyate // verse 53. 
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This articulation of defects bifurcates them in much the same way as the Vṛttikāra does; either a 
cognition is false because the cause which led to its production was somehow defective, in the 
way that defects of the eye could yield inaccurate representations of an object, or because a later 
cognition overturns the first. The important distinction here is between those defects which 
produce cognitions that cannot be apprehended differently because the cause is permanently 
defective and those defects which are temporarily defective which are overturned by later 
awarenesses to the contrary. If someone is prone to see double due to a disorder or disease of the 
eye the knowledge that one’s perception of two objects, when there is really only one, does not, 
strictly speaking, get overturned by an accurate awareness that there is only one object—such an 
individual can only see double—but rather by the awareness that the eye is defective, e.g. by 
being told so by a specialist. 
 Kumārila’s own articulation of defects is also motivated by a different understanding of 
invalidity. As the opponent previously asserted invalidity must be intrinsic to cognition because it 
is not an actual thing. However, Kumārila rejects this assertion claiming that: 
Invalidity is divided three-fold into false cognition, non-cognition and doubt. Of 
these two are able to [arise] from a cause which is defective because they are 
actual things.62 
The division of invalid cognitions is clear: one may misapprehend, doubt what one apprehends 
or have no apprehension at all. Implicit in the second half of the verse is that the only invalid 
cognition which is not an actual thing is non-cognition, since it has no cause whatsoever, while 
the other two are real and so arise from defective causes.63 In effect Kumārila’s restructuring of 
the epistemic process from one of validation to one of invalidation as method, as Arnold has 
                                                          
62. ŚV, 92. aprāmāṇyaṃ tridhā bhinnaṃ mithyātvājñānasaṃśayaiḥ / 
           vastutvād dvividhasyātra sambhavo duṣṭakāraṇāt // verse 54. 
63. According to Kei this division is already implicit in the Vṛttikāra. Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and 
Killing. Part 2. An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāsūtra), 127. 
 
 
32 
 
pointed out, involves a reversal of the norm of South Asian epistemology. In more classical 
accounts of epistemology—indeed this seems to be how both Śabara and the Vṛttikāra approach 
the problem—one begins by discussing the pramāṇas by attempting to articulate how they 
function and effectively produce valid cognition, but on Kumārila’s account we start with the 
question of validity and then move on to the pramāṇas. Thus, “whatever it is in regard to which 
one has prāmāṇya [validity] is what should be called a pramāṇa.” 64 At this point it is important 
to note how Kumārila’s assertion that the validity of all valid awarenesses effectively expands to 
include all forms of awarenesses, even invalid ones. To begin with, while Kumārila only believes 
that accurate awarenesses are intrinsically valid he does not foresee any way of determining 
whether a given awareness is valid or invalid before it arises. This fact leads to justification in 
entertaining any awareness in the absence of counter evidence and Kumārila is seen explicitly 
outlining how this process takes place when one putatively valid awareness is blocked by a later 
cognition. For example, Kumārila says: 
Since, in that case too, validity is intrinsic by itself because of the absence of a 
cognition of defects [in the cause] and where the cognition of defects has not 
arisen doubt [about that awareness] is unwarranted. Thus, no additional 
awarenesses are required other than the three or four cognitions already produced 
since in the course of just this many awarenesses one attains intrinsic validity.65 
Here Kumārila is articulating how a process of multiple overturned awarenesses settles over 
time. Thus, according to him the first awareness is intrinsically valid through the absence of 
defeaters but should some awareness arise the original awareness is stripped of its validity and 
the second awareness becomes intrinsically valid. According to Kumārila we can conceive of 
                                                          
64. Arnold 87.  
65. ŚV,  95-96. svata eva hi tatrāpi doṣājñānāt pramāṇatā / 
                doṣajñāne tv anutpanne na śaṅkyā niṣpramāṇatā // 
                evaṃ tricaturajñānajanmano nādhikā matiḥ / 
                prārthyate tāvataivaikaṃ svataḥ prāmāṇyam aśnute // verse 60-61. 
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this awareness also being overturned which would reinstate the original awarenesses validity. 
Thus, validity is simply dependent on the absence of blocking awarenesses and applies to all 
awarenesses until they are overturned, the difference being that those awarenesses which 
Kumārila deems valid are simply those which have not yet been overturned. Additionally, 
Kumārila seems to be claiming that in general this kind of oscillation between awarenesses and 
counter awarenesses tends to level out after three or four cognitions so that we are not suspended 
in a state of uncertainty about all appearances. This formulation is in keeping with the principle 
of phenomenal conservatism which states that “if it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of 
defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.”66 On this account 
Kumārila can be seen asserting that the relevant variation in a given appearance of an awareness 
is whether a defeater has arisen or not and that in the absence of such a defeater we are justified 
in our belief that p.  
It is here that we see Kumārila’s innovation, although informed by the MSBh in its 
foundations, most clearly. Kumārila introduces an account of justification as the only epistemic 
project with purchase. It is his goal to present an formulation of justification which accounts for 
the natural inclination of how things appear to us and as a result concludes that we are 
intrinsically justified in our assent to each and every awareness by the ordinary character of the 
awareness itself. Thus, Kumārila is not presenting an account presumptive justification as a stop-
gap in the epistemic framework but rather is attempting to describe how appearances justify our 
beliefs generally. This is not to say that things cannot turn out otherwise, that a given belief 
cannot be falsified later, but rather that, given the limits of what can be seen and the uselessness 
of validating procedures, we can be confident in what presents itself to us until we have reason to 
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suspect it. The similarity to Huemer here is striking. For example, Huemer is committed to the 
idea that “epistemic justification is conferred by appearances of all sorts, whether sensory, 
intellectual, mnemonic, or introspective” and that “all species of appearances [are] equally valid 
sources of justification.”67 Endorsing justification of appearances in this way allows one to argue 
that, as well as explain how, a “detailed hallucination provides the same sort of justification for 
believing its content that a normal perceptual experience does.”68 Thus, both Kumārila and 
Huemer are attempting to describe the features or character of appearances, or awarenesses in 
Kumārila’s case, which enable them to naturally confer some form of justification on the knower 
entertaining their content. 
The simplicity of this argument relies on Kumārila’s lack of interest in accounting for 
how one moves from sense experience to knowledge which, as I have tried to show, is the 
principle difficulty Śabara and the Vṛttikāra seem to face in their epistemologies. We do not have 
to search for defects, as the Vṛttikāra claimed, but rather are justified in trusting perceptual 
experience until it has been disproven. Thus, as Kumārila articulates the situation, not only the 
Veda but all knowledge is correct until proven otherwise, however, it is still the special character 
of the Veda which safeguards it from falsification. 
2. JAYANTA’S REJECTION OF INTRINSIC VALIDITY & HIS THEORY OF DOUBT 
2.1. Jayanta’s Account & Refutation of Intrinsic Validity 
As I have argued so far there are a number of methodological similarities between Mīmāṃsā 
epistemology and some accounts of justification in the West but in some sense I have obscured 
                                                          
67. By appearance Huemer explains that he means “a kind of propositional attitude, different from belief, 
of which sensory experience, apparent memory, intuition, and apparent introspective awareness are species.” 
Huemer, 30 & 31.  
68. Ibid, 33.  
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part of the difficulty in analyzing or interpreting Kumārila’s discussion of the topic. Primarily I 
am referring to the usage of the word prāmāṇya which, following Taber, I have chosen to 
translate as validity.69 This term does not unambiguously translate as such and is not used by 
Kumārila in one obviously clear sense. Instead his discussion encourages us to make certain 
judgements about how the term is employed and what precise sense it carries in his philosophy. 
What is of primary concern here is whether the validity of all cognition should be taken to mean 
the truth of all cognitions, i.e. in the Western sense of justified true belief, or as something else. 
Once again, I have tried to show that there is good evidence to suggest that it means something 
more like justification but this is not how all of his commentators, critics or even modern 
interpreters have understood the term and so some time should be taken to unpack the concept. 
This will prove invaluable for the following discussion of Jayanta’s critique of the theory and 
help to show how it motivates him to make some of the more innovative epistemological moves 
that he does.  
 The primary difficulty concerning the term is its relation to the word pramāṇa which I 
have suggested can be translated as a valid means of knowledge, e.g. perception or inference. 
But the term can also be used to apply to the knowledge event produced by a pramāṇa and so 
can be translated as an accurate cognition. It is in this second sense that the term is used in the 
locus classicus of Kumārila’s theory of intrinsic validity, i.e. that “the validity (prāmāṇya) of all 
accurate cognitions (pramāṇa) is intrinsic.” This formulation could easily lead one to conclude 
that prāmāṇya in this sense must mean something like truth insofar as it is specifically stated that 
the cognitions under consideration are those that are accurate and not just cognition in general, 
but given some of Kumārila’s later comments it becomes clear that this interpretation is not quite 
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correct, at least not when we consider how Kumārila actually uses the term. This is made clear 
by the fact that Kumārila believes that we are justified in claiming intrinsic validity for 
cognitions pro tem even if they are later over turned. Thus, the validity of a given cognition 
results from the very fact that it is a cognition, that it appears in the same way ordinary 
awarenesses appear, nothing else, and that it can only be rejected by being overturned at some 
later date.70 If the term prāmāṇya is taken to mean truth, it is quite difficult to explain such a 
formulation on Kumārila’s part and we would somehow have to account for truth which is quite 
different from how the term is usually employed. 
 The terminological slippage of the term prāmāṇya, while difficult to account for in 
Kumārila’s tradition—especially as discussed by his commentators—also presents one 
convenient avenue for critique of the theory. Since, by simply taking the term to mean truth 
instead of justification, the entire epistemology loses what Kumārila clearly articulates are its 
most compelling features, i.e. its ability to easily account for the justificatory nature of 
perception, or experience, and the lack of need for validation procedures. It is in precisely this 
way that Jayanta criticizes the theory of intrinsic validity. Unlike Kumārila, Jayanta defines the 
term prāmāṇya explicitly, stating: “since it is said that a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) 
                                                          
70. With this point in mind it is interesting to look at the four kinds of awareness Kumārila mentions 
explicitly in his discussion of the theory in the ŚV, i.e. accurate awareness, inaccurate awareness, doubt, and non-
cognition. With respect to these four, we have already seen, in fact Kumārila has explicitly stated, how the first two 
function with regard to intrinsic validity. For example, all awarenesses are intrinsically valid unless or until they are 
blocked or overturned and then become inaccurate awarenesses. But how would Kumārila articulate the situation 
with respect to doubt? It seems that two obvious options are available to him: first, he might claim that the 
occurrence of doubt is a later development or effect of an originally intrinsically valid awareness whereby the 
content is not outright contradicted or overturned but rather called into question, second, he might claim that 
awarenesses such as doubt are the exception to the rule of intrinsic validity. It seems that the former option accounts 
for Kumarla’s theory more adequately and is more obviously in keeping with what I have presented so far but since 
he does not address the topic one can only suspect how he would deal with the problem. It is also worth noting that 
the opponent could also respond to the first hypothetical answer I have provided by saying that while it is the case 
that some doubts occur in this way there are also some doubts which appear to us as doubtful from the very 
beginning which would seemingly undermine this account. 
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discloses an object as it actually is, [so] this thing called validity (prāmāṇya) is the non-deviation 
concerning the very object of a valid means of knowledge.”71 This definition definitively shows 
that Jayanta interprets validity not in the justificatory sense outlined previously but instead as 
being the accurate representation of the object as it really is, i.e. excluding all invalid cognitions. 
From this basic interpretive move Jayanta proceeds to demonstrate how validity on this account 
cannot be accepted intrinsically. 
  It is important to note at the outset that Jayanta is also concerned with establishing the 
validity of Vedic texts and so sees his own tradition directly at odds with Kumārila’s. This fact 
features prominently in many of Jayanta’s arguments against the tradition of Mīmāṃsā and his 
primary aim in his engagements with the tradition is to demonstrate how and why Mīmāṃsā 
should be limited in its scope to the analysis of scriptural passages only.72 This is especially 
evident in Jayanta’s epistemological concerns where he asserts that the tradition should restrict 
itself to interpretive theory and refrain from engaging in epistemology at all. In part it seems that 
Jayanta views the theory of intrinsic validity as being too epistemically weak when applied to the 
Veda and so begins by refuting this theory before defending his own epistemology which he 
believes uniquely establishes, with certainty, the validity of the Veda. Jayanta’s presentation of 
the epistemological discussion addressed here is presented in the third chapter (tṛtīya-āhnika) of 
his magnum opus, known as The Cluster of Blossoms of Nyāya (Nyāyamañjarī), which addresses 
testimony as a valid means of knowledge.  
                                                          
71. NM, 232.7-8. arthatathātvaprakāśakaṃ hi pramāṇam ity uktam. tasya svaprameyāvyabhicāritvaṃ nāma 
prāmāṇyam. 
72. See esp. Kataoka, “Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on the purpose of Nyāya.” South Asian Classical Studies 1 (2006): 
147-174.  
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At the most basic level of Jayanta’s critique of Kumārila’s epistemology it is clear that he 
maintains that the theory of intrinsic validity simply cannot be accounted for as a process. At the 
very outset of his critique Jayanta asks what the expression “validity is intrinsic” even means and 
presents four potential solutions: is it that validity is grasped by the accurate cognition itself? or 
that the validity of the cognition arises from itself? or that validity does not depend on any other 
factor when determining its object? or that validity is determined independently? It appears from 
Jayanta’s analysis of the expression that he feels he has exhaustively supplied all possible 
answers to the question and proceeds to show how each in turn fails to account for the intrinsic 
nature of validity.  
 Kumārila’s epistemology, for Jayanta, cannot coherently be analyzed in terms of the 
cognition’s grasping its own validity. Jayanta begins by attempting to show that there is no 
possible way to account for the cognitions grasping its own validity since for him validity can 
only be established by things extraneous to the cognition. Jayanta explains: 
To begin with the grasping of validity by [the cognition] itself is not possible, 
since it is unprovable. To explain: perception is busy presenting that blue thing as 
blue and perception, which is produced from the connection of an object and the 
sense faculty, is just a valid means of knowledge for that blue thing. This is what 
we know.73 
The point here is rather clear; perception, in keeping with pramāṇa theory in South Asia, is an 
instrument of acquiring knowledge and so it is busy presenting the awareness of its object and so 
cannot also grasp its own validity. That is to say, perception of a particular object produces a 
awareness of the object as blue and perception is only a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for 
that blue object and so cannot also be a valid means of knowledge for its validity, i.e. it cannot 
                                                          
73. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 東洋文
化研究所紀要/The Memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, 169 (2016) 523(40).4-6. na tāvat svayam eva 
prāmāṇyagrahaṇam upapannam, aprāmāṇikatvāt. tathā hi yadetannīlaprakāśane pravṛttaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tannīlaṃ prati 
tāvat pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam iti jānīma evaitat. 
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produce both the cognition of blue and the cognition that the cognition of blue is valid.  
Additionally, Jayanta explains that according to the tradition of Mīmāṃsā cognitions cannot be 
perceived at all since they are outside the scope of perception and their existence can only be 
inferred based on the fact that the object is presented to us.74 This fact effectively situates the 
validity of cognition outside of the domain of perception for the Mīmāṃsaka and so rules out the 
possibility that it is perception that grasps the validity of a cognition. Further still, Jayanta claims 
that perception also cannot grasp the validity of a judgement that is derived from the original 
cognition insofar as the validity of that judgement depends on the actual state of affairs and not 
on the sense faculties.75 That is to say, since perception is produced from the connection between 
an object and the sense faculty, at least according to Jayanta’s tradition, the resulting judgment 
formed from the original cognition is also not amenable to the senses and so cannot be perceived.  
 While it is true that Mīmāṃsakas maintain that cognitions cannot be perceived directly 
they do not claim that cognitions cannot be ascertained at all but rather that they are cognized 
inferentially. For example, Kumārila in particular asserts that from the fact that an object is 
cognized we are able to infer that a cognition has taken place.76 So, Jayanta asks, can the validity 
of the cognition be grasped inferentially? The difficulty with this method of grasping validity, 
according to Jayanta, is that there is no inferential sign which would warrant an inference of 
                                                          
74. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
523(40).13-522(41).1. tatra jñātṛvyāpārātmano jñānasya bhavanmate nityaparokṣatvāt pratyakṣataḥ svataḥ 
paricchedānupapattau tatprāmāṇyasyāpi kathaṃ pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇam? 
75. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
522(41).4-6. phalasya apy arthaprakāśanākhyasya saṃvedanātmano na indriyasaṃsargayogyatā vidyate, yena 
tadgatam api yathārthatvalakṣaṇaṃ prāmāṇyam indriyavyāpāralabdhajanmanā pratyakṣeṇa paricchidyeta. 
76. Bimal Krishna Matilal, Logic, Language & Reality. 2nd edn. reprint. (Delhi: Motilal  
Banarsidass, 1997) 243.  
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validity and so he answers in the negative.77 However, he explains what options the opponent 
might entertain in order to respond to this question nevertheless. He begins by explaining: 
The resultant [judgment], which is the effect of a cognition which consists in the 
function of the knowing agent, is itself the inferential sign which is able to cause 
one to infer the mere existence of the nature [of that judgement] because of 
grasping the pervasion of the resultant [judgment] by mere activity, [but] it is not 
able to cause one to infer the validity [of that judgement] which is characterized 
by the state of being in accordance [with the state of the world]. Since the validity 
of that which is its cause (i.e. the cognition) which is the function of the knower 
could be caused to be inferred either by a resultant [judgment] which is not 
qualified [by correspondence] or by a resultant [judgement] which is qualified by 
correspondence.78 
As I have here interpreted Jayanta’s point, the only thing that we can infer from the judgement 
formed from the original cognition is its mere existence by reason of the fact that it occurred, not 
its validity. But what does Jayanta make of his last two points? On the first account, i.e. if we 
were able to infer validity from a resultant judgement—which here serves as the inferential 
sign—which is not qualified by correspondence to the actual world, then we could infer validity 
from any inferential sign at all and there would be no such thing as invalidity, which is simply 
not correct. On the second account, according to Jayanta, there is no method for determining that 
the resultant judgement is qualified by accuracy and so cannot be used to infer the validity of the 
cognition.79 Even if the Mīmāṃsaka claims that our experience simply presents the resultant 
                                                          
77. An inferential sign is something that is connected to the thing to be proved, in this case validity, which 
has to be present in the subject of the inference, in this case the resultant judgement. For example, the inference of 
fire on a distant mountain is warranted by the presence of the property smoke which is invariably connected with 
fire. So in this case, for Jayanta, the inference of validity on the part of the resultant cognition cannot be inferred 
because we do not know of any property present in the resulting cognition which is invariably connected with 
validity. 
78. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
521(42).3-6. jñātṛvyāparātmano jñānasya tu svakāryaṃ phalaṃ bhaved api liṅgam phalasya 
kriyāmātravyāptigrahaṇāt svarūpasattāmātram anumāpayitum utsahate, na yathārthatvalakṣaṇaṃ prāmāṇyam. tad hi 
phalaṃ nirviśeṣaṇaṃ vā svakāraṇasya jñātṛvyāpārasya prāmāṇyam anumāpayet yathārthatvaviśiṣṭaṃ vā.   
79. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
521(42).8-9. ādye pakṣe yataḥ kutaś cana phalāt tatprāmāṇyānumāne nedāniṃ kiñcid apramāṇaṃ bhavet. uttaro 'pi 
nāsti pakṣaḥ phalagatayāthārthyaparicchedopāyābhāvād ity uktam.  
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judgement as valid, Jayanta explains that this solution cannot account for cases of perceptual 
error, since in the case of perceptual error also we are presented with an awareness as accurate 
which actually is not.80 The difficulty of accounting for how validity could be grasped by the 
cognition it belongs to provides justification for Jayanta’s rejection of this possible explanation 
of the meaning of the expression, “validity is intrinsic.” 
 The need to exhaustively refute the theory of intrinsic validity is motivated by Jayanta’s 
concept of certainty, and this fact is evident in the method of attack he employs in critiquing the 
theory. This is also reflected in Jayanta’s discussion of the possibility that validity arises 
intrinsically. In his assessment of this explanation of intrinsic validity Jayanta refers back to his 
analysis of what validity (prāmāṇya) is and he explains as follows: 
If the view that validity arises by itself is resorted to [by the Mīmāṃsakas] this 
too is unsuitable because the production of effects depends on their causes and 
validity is an effect. Since validity exists, i.e. is an actual thing, and not eternal, 
thus it is an effect. And an effect cannot be produced by itself precisely because it 
is an effect. [emphasis mine]81 
As he sees it, validity is the result or effect of a belief forming process, i.e. the functioning of a 
valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), and so depends on its cause for its production. This fact 
necessarily prevents the possibility that validity could be produced independently and so refutes 
this method of accounting for intrinsic validity. 
  At this point we might point out that Kumārila seemingly already admitted this fact by 
stating that while causes are necessary for the production of their effects they are no longer relied 
                                                          
80. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
521(42).15-520(43).2. nanu svānubhava eva atra upāyaḥ. tad dhi nīlasaṃvedanatayā phalaṃ svata eva prakāśate. 
nīlasaṃvedanatvam eva ca asya yathārthatvam, nānyat. yady evaṃ śuktikāyām api rajatasaṃvedane samāno nyāyaḥ. 
na hi rajatasaṃvedanādanya yathārthatvasaṃvittir iti. 
81. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
515(48).15-18. atha svataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ bhavati ity eṣa pakṣa āśrīyate so 'py ayuktaḥ, kāryāṇāṃ 
kāraṇādhīnajanmatvāt, prāmāṇyasya ca kāryatvāt. asti hi prāmāṇyaṃ, vastu ca tat, na ca nityam iti kāryam eva tat. 
kāryaṃ ca kāryatvād eva na svato bhavitum arhati iti.  
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upon when their effect preforms its particular function. As we saw previously the paradigmatic 
example here is a clay pot which depends on the clay, potter, etc. for its fabrication but does not 
depend on them for its use once it has been created. How does Jayanta refute this claim? In the 
case of validity Jayanta states the following potential solutions: 
What was said, [namely that] a valid means of knowledge does not depend on 
anything else in performing its own function, that should be explained. Does [the 
statement] “the valid means of knowledge is independent in performing its own 
function” mean that the totality of causal factors [which led to that valid means of 
knowledge] are independent, or that one member of that totality of causal factors 
is independent, or that the cognition which is produced from that totality of causal 
factors is independent?82 
If the independence of a valid means of knowledge amounts to the claim that the totality of 
causal factors which led to the production of that knowledge event are independent then Jayanta 
claims this is true.83 To begin with, Jayanta defines a valid means of knowledge as the totality of 
causal factors, both conscious and unconscious, which bring about an awareness of an object 
which is both invariant and indubitable.84 Thus, if the Mīmāṃsaka is saying that the totality of 
causal factors which produced the awareness are independent of anything else then according to 
Jayanta’s definition of a valid means of knowledge this is necessarily true. The concept of the 
totality of causal factors is articulated to account for all the necessary elements which produce an 
effect, no more and no less, i.e. they are all that is necessary to produce the effect and so are 
independent of anything else. But this does not mean that validity is intrinsic since validity 
                                                          
82. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
513(50).6-8. yad api ca svakāryakaraṇe pramāṇasya parānapekṣatvam ucyate tad api vyākhyeyam. kiṃ pramāṇaṃ 
svakāryakaraṇe nirapekṣam sāmagrī vā tadekadeśo vā tajjanyaṃ vā jñānam iti.  
83. What I have translated as the totality of causal factors (sāmagrī) is a term that is used to describe all the 
relevant causal factors which lead to the production of an effect. E.g. the necessity of a seed, sunlight, water, etc. for 
the production of a sprout. 
84. NM, 20.11-12. tad ucyate. avyabhicāriṇīm asandigdhām arthopalabdhiṃ vidadhatī 
bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam.  
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requires something extraneous for its demonstration.85 How exactly we should interpret this 
point is unclear insofar as it does not seem to show that validity is extrinsic but instead seems to 
presuppose that it is. However, as I have interpreted the argument the point seems to be that the 
totality of causal factor independently produces a valid means of knowledge whose content is 
valid but this only implies that validity is present, not that it is reflexively demonstrable. In 
accordance with this presentation of what the totality of causal factors actually are, Jayanta 
points out that a single member of the totality of causal factors cannot be independent insofar as 
it is dependent on the other factors by definition. That is to say, the fact that they are the set of 
causal factors means they are interdependent and so one of them cannot be independent of the 
others.86 Lastly, Jayanta explains that the cognition that results from the set of causal factors is 
itself an effect and so has no effect of its own with respect to which it could be considered 
dependent or independent. Additionally, in actual practice, according to Jayanta, it turns out 
people engage in particular actions based on their desire to achieve specific aims and so do not 
do so independently.87 Once again Jayanta’s argument hinges on the commitment that validity is 
both capable of demonstration and necessary which, as I have already suggested, may not 
represent the actual intention of Kumārila’s epistemology.  
In many of Jayanta’s arguments his obvious unwillingness to accept the type of epistemic 
account Kumārila presents is quite evident and it is clear that, unlike his opponent, Jayanta 
                                                          
85. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
513(50).10-11. tatra sāmagryāḥ satyaṃ svakāryajanmani nairapekṣyam asti. na tu tāvatā svataḥ prāmāṇyam, 
tatparicchedasya parāyattatvāt. 
86. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
513(50).13-14. sāmagryantargatakārakasya svakārye parāpekṣatvam aparihāryam, ekasmāt kārakāt 
kāryanirvṛttyasambhāvāt. 
87. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
513(50).16-512(51).2. jñānaṃ phalam eva na pramāṇam iti uktam. na ca phalātmanas tasya   svakāryaṃ kiñcid asti, 
yatra sāpekṣatvam anapekṣatvaṃ vā asya cintyeta. puruṣapravṛttyādau tu tadicchādyapekṣatvaṃ vidyata eva iti 
yatkiñcid etat.  
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believes that we can successfully validate our awarenesses extrinsically and so obtain a higher 
level of confidence in our cognitive practices and in the Veda in particular. This is patently 
obvious in Jayanta’s final critique of the theory of intrinsic validity. As we have seen Jayanta 
does not believe that validity can be grasped intrinsically and he ends his critique be explaining 
the extraneous character of determination as he conceives of it. He explains that, 
To begin with it is said that there is no determination of validity at the time of the 
first impression which motivates [one to act]. Since at that time validity is not 
able to be determined by the pramāṇa which is grasping blue just as it cannot 
determine the nature of blue. However, it is true that there is the determination of 
validity at another time, but in such a case it is not independent, because the 
determination of validity depends on the capacity for activity.88  
Here Jayanta is attempting to demonstrate that there is no method which can account for how the 
determination of validity could take place by itself and in this context he emphasizes the fact that 
the determination of validity simply cannot be coterminous with the cognition in question. 
Instead, determination must arise later as a result of our successful action for a particular purpose 
or as a result of our failure in the case of determining invalidity of the original cognition 
retrospectively. The assessment of how our awarenesses are verified situates the verifying 
process outside of the domain of the cognition itself and so shows, for Jayanta, that validity 
cannot be intrinsic in the end.  
 At this point it is important to stress two main points about Jayanta’s critique of 
Kumārila’s epistemology. The first point, which has already been pointed out, is that there seems 
to be an essential difference between the way Kumārila and Jayanta approach the problem of 
knowledge. As we have already seen Kumārila does not emphasize a verifying process in which 
                                                          
88. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
512(51).7-11. tatra prathamapravartakapratibhāsaprasavasamaye tāvan nāsty eva prāmāṇyaniścaya ity uktam. na hi 
nīlagrāhiṇā pramāṇena nīlasvarūpam iva prāmāṇyam api tadānīṃ niścetuṃ śakyata iti. kālāntare tu 
prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ satyam asti, na tu tatra nairapekṣyam, pravṛttisāmarthyādhīnatvāt tanniścayasya. 
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the burden of proof rests on the knower. Instead he seems to believe that false beliefs will 
eventually be found out and that all cognitions, after a certain amount of time, level out in 
accordance with our regular experience and that any attempt to validate knowledge through 
corroboration is both useless, i.e. it adds nothing to the process, and is epistemically circular. As 
I have argued Kumārila can be seen presenting an account of justification which is conferred by 
all awarenesses in the absence of defeaters. Jayanta, on the other hand, asserts that to the extent 
that we are concerned with the truth of our cognitions certainty about those cognitions must be 
demonstrated and that the only way to do this is to appeal to factors outside of the cognition in 
question and the time of its occurrence. Using this assumption Jayanta addresses Kumārila’s 
epistemology through the very same scheme that Kumārila seems to reject, or at least shied away 
from. This is most evident in Jayanta’s concern for the character of validity which, as I have 
suggested, seems to differ from how Kumārila employs the term. While it is true that Jayanta 
does not return to the traditional pramāṇa based discussion of epistemology, it is evident that he 
simply does not accept Kumārila’s belief that all other attempts to account for validity fail. The 
second point is that Jayanta sees the need for validation emanating from the commitment that 
there are such categories as valid and invalid cognition. As far as he is concerned the fact that 
this dichotomy exists gives rise to a kind of uncertainty about each and every cognition up until 
it is verified and so verification is necessary. 
 2.2 Jayanta on Epistemic Objectives & Doubt 
 It is Jayanta’s concern with epistemic certainty that encourages him to attack the 
Mīmāṃsā account of knowledge in general and Vedic validity in particular. As we have just seen 
this is motivated by the belief that the theory of intrinsic validity is epistemically weak, and as 
such insufficient as a proof for scriptural knowledge, and inadequate as an account knowledge 
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generally. Jayanta makes this clear through his conceptualization of our cognitive enterprise in 
relation to the type of object we are investigating. That is to say, Jayanta claims that our 
epistemic attitude and constraints vary based on the object of inquiry, i.e. on what is at stake and 
the context in which we are operating. As I will try to point out this epistemological innovation 
shares some interesting similarities with the kind of substantive, or subject, contextualism 
espoused by Michael Williams and so I will be drawing some comparisons between these two 
theories in what follows.89 At the most basic level Jayanta divides epistemic concerns into two 
categories: the everyday, worldly, domain which is perceptible by ordinary people (dṛṣṭa) and 
the transcendent, religious, domain which is only communicable through extraordinary means 
(adṛṣṭa). In accordance with Jayanta’s contextualist inclinations each domain has different 
standards for what counts as knowledge and those standards are dictated by the inherent stakes 
entailed by the knower’s epistemic success or failure. As Jayanta explains: 
Moreover, the two-fold path of the aims of people is divided into worldly 
[purposes] and transcendent [purposes]. In the first case, people who have not 
consulted scripture act with respect to those worldly objects whose means [of 
attainment], such as eating etc., are obtained through co-presence and absence of 
what is established by the practice of innumerable elders, since scripture is not 
employed [to communicate] that those who are dirty should bathe and those who 
are hungry should eat.90 
In this passage Jayanta makes the distinction between these two domains clear and appeals to 
insights similar to those outlined by Mīmāṃsā already. Namely that there are desirable objects 
outside the ken of ordinary humans, which are not accessible via perception etc., and that they 
                                                          
89. It is important to note that the claim is mostly limited to the kind of contextualism Williams presents 
because it lacks the concern for the semantic form that the majority of contextualists are concerned with today. That 
is to say, Jayanta is concerned with contextual factors in relation to the knowing subject and not to the person 
attributing knowledge to that subject.  
90. NM, 6.11-14. dṛṣṭādṛṣṭabhedena ca dvividhaḥ puruṣātrhasya panthāḥ. tatra dṛṣṭe viṣaye 
suciraprarūḍhavṛddhavyavahārasiddhānvayavyatirekādhigatasādhanabhāve bhojanādāv anapekṣitaśāstrasyaiva 
bhavati pravṛttiḥ. na hi ‘malinaḥ snāyāt’, ‘bubhukṣito vā 'śnīyāt’ iti śāstram upayujyate. 
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are to be communicated by scripture. As such Jayanta is relying on similar methodology to 
Kumārila but with the addition of the important division just put forward. While Mīmāṃsā also 
commits itself to the idea that scripture conveys information beyond our everyday experience it 
attempts to explain how the method and function of that communication is no different from any 
other knowing process and so seeks to legitimize scripture as the general epistemic rule and not 
the exception. Jayanta, on the other hand, is wholly unsatisfied with this move and instead 
attempts to explicate how and why our investigative procedures should differ when applied to 
extraordinary spheres of knowledge and it is in this context that he draws the explicit distinction 
between the two domains. 
 The variation of practices and purposes to be achieved through human actions and 
procedures is essential to the development of Jayanta’s contextualist insights. At the most 
fundamental level this is indicated by his decision to draw a distinction between the two domains 
to begin with but it is also evident in other epistemological commitments on Jayanta’s part. To 
begin with Jayanta explains the transcendent domain of knowledge as follows: 
However, with respect to transcendent aims whose domain is liberation and 
heaven scripture alone shows for people whose sight is impaired by the intense 
darkness of innate delusion. When observing a means to all true things only 
scripture is appropriate for such people who have eyes like ours, unlike Yogis for 
whom there are other means such as the awareness produced from yogic 
meditation.91 
The unique character of heaven and liberation coupled with the limitations of ordinary peoples’ 
perceptual apparatuses prevents knowledge of such transcendent objects and so scripture is 
required for communication of their character and for instruction on how to attain them. 
Underlying much of what Jayanta wants to say is the belief that ordinary people are, at least for 
                                                          
91. NM, 6.15-17. adṛṣṭe tu svargāpavargamārge naisārgikamohāndhatamasaviluptālokasya lokasya śāstram 
eva prakāśaḥ. tad eva sakalasadupāyadarśane divyaṃ cakṣur asmadādeḥ na yoginām iva 
yogasamādhijajñānādyupāyāntaram api iti. 
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the most part, practically rational and so can be cited as evidence whenever and wherever 
necessary.92 That is to say, Jayanta’s discussion of how people tend to conduct themselves in 
both worldly and transcendent domains is structured around the belief that these people are 
reasonable knowing agents who, when pursuing certain ends, conduct themselves in 
advantageous and reasonable ways.  
 The concept of two domains of knowledge in combinations with the commitment that 
there are rational people to use as examples for the procedures relevant to each domain allows 
Jayanta to establish a pattern of practically rational behavior in both spheres. Thus, rational 
people engage in everyday behavior without consulting technical literature, principally scripture, 
and do not perform sacrifices, etc., without doing so. This observation also allows Jayanta to 
make a more robust claim concerning the epistemic practices of rational people in these two 
domains. Jayanta explains as follows: 
Insofar as, with regard to the pramāṇas such as perception etc., whose objects are 
perceptible, [our] everyday practices are accomplished without determining their 
validity, so, for us, there is no purpose in the consideration of whether validity is 
intrinsic or extrinsic [since] uncertainty is preferable in such cases. However, with 
regard to transcendent matters it is inappropriate for practically rational people to 
act without accurately determining the validity of those acts since Vedic action 
must be accomplished through costly procedures such as the expenditure of 
excessive wealth.93 
By appealing to the epistemic behavior of practically rational people Jayanta is able to present 
his own assessment of the relevant contextual factors present in both domains of knowledge. 
                                                          
92. The phrase ‘practically rational’ is borrowed from Vincent Eltschinger and is a translation of the 
relevant Sanskrit term prekṣāvat. Eltschinger, “Turning Hermeneutics into Apologetics. Reasoning and Rationality 
under Changing Circumstances” In Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action. Proceedings of a Panel at the 14th 
World Sanskrit Conference Kyoto, September 1st–5th 2009, edited by Vincent Eltschinger & Helmut Krasser. 
(Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2013) esp. 103-105. 
93. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
524(39).8-12. pratyakṣādiṣu dṛṣṭārtheṣu pramāṇeṣu prāmāṇyaniścayam antareṇa eva vyavahārasiddhes tatra kiṃ 
svataḥ prāmāṇyam uta parataḥ iti vicāreṇa na naḥ prayojanam anirṇaya eva tatra śreyān. adṛṣṭe tu viṣaye vaidikeṣu 
agaṇitadraviṇavitaraṇādikleśasādhyeṣu karmasu tatprāmāṇyāvadhāraṇam antareṇa prekṣāvatāṃ pravartanam 
anucitam iti. 
 
 
49 
 
Whether or not we should consider Jayanta as committing himself to two different meanings of 
the word know or valid in worldly and transcendental domains is unclear and worth consideration 
but for the time being it is important to note that Jayanta does clearly align himself with what 
Williams has called economic factors of justification and knowledge. In this context Jayanta can 
be seen as claiming that “how much reason we require fixes the severity of our epistemic 
standards or level of scrutiny,” that depending on whether we are concerned with everyday 
objects or matters of religious duty we are held to different standards of truth.94 While it might 
suffice for rational people to conduct their business sans pre-action verification in their daily life 
it is not reasonable to do so in contexts that require higher level of certainty, e.g. in religious 
sacrifice. It is clear that at least one motivating factor for this innovation is Jayanta’s awareness 
of the role that epistemic stakes play in our activity. As Williams explains: 
If it is important to reach some decision, and if the costs of error are fairly low, or 
if we gain a lot by being right and lose a little by being wrong, it is reasonable to 
take a relaxed attitude to justificational standards. If the costs of error are high, 
more demanding standards may be in order.95 
Thus it is fair to say that for Jayanta the high monetary stakes necessitated by religious practice 
are of some serious concern but it also seems likely that he is aware of the possible negative 
results that might incur if one fails to observe their religious duties properly. On the other hand, 
in matters of everyday life, the stakes are frequently relatively low and so less rigorous 
verification processes are typical. Additionally, it seems plausible that there are even differing 
standards for certainty even within everyday mundane engagements. For example, monetary 
stakes are relevant in both sacrificial procedures as well as the daily practices of almost all 
people. For this reasons, I would argue that, while Jayanta does not explicitly state it, monetary 
                                                          
94. Michael Williams, Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 161. 
95. Ibid.  
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factors should also play a significant role in the worldly domain.96 There is some evidence that 
Jayanta considers conditioned awarenesses to require less rigorous verification standards as well 
insofar as the repeated experience of their occurrence adds to their stability.97 
 What does it mean for us to interpret Jayanta’s division of transcendent and worldly 
domains as involving more and less rigorous standards of verification respectively? And how can 
this interpretation of Jayanta’s epistemology account for the fact that Jayanta explicitly states 
that uncertainty is preferable to verification in our everyday practices, since this claim seems to 
imply that the standards for verification are not lower in worldly affairs but instead non-existent? 
In order to explain the apparent inconsistency it is important to recall that Jayanta, as previously 
discussed, insists that validity can be determined in our daily practices but by our success or 
failure to achieve our objectives. The important thing, as he sees it (especially in relation to 
Kumārila’s theory) is that validity is not determined as the cognition is arising but rather at a 
later time when we can retrospectively judge the original cognitions content against our success 
                                                          
96. One further consideration is how Jayanta might address social factors in reference to different standards 
of justification. For example, how standards of justification can be seen to change in circumstances when one is 
engaged in discussion with experts as compared to non-experts in a particular field.  
97. Jayanta addresses this point under his preliminary assessment of how pragmatically effective behavior 
validates our awarenesses which will be discussed at length later on. Let it suffice to say that Jayanta sees the 
increased experience of the results we expect from certain occurrences in the world as bolstering their stability and 
in turn our trust in their occurrence. To quote: “It could be the case that activity is of two types: initial and repeated. 
As an example of initial activity [consider] activity which takes the form of sowing a certain number of seeds in a 
dish which is filled with smooth earth and sprinkled with water in order to test the potency of seeds such as rice. 
After this farmers who have observed the regular capacity of those [seeds] to produce sprouts sow those seeds in 
their fields without hesitation and this is repeated activity. Thus, in the present case also some intelligent people 
having begun common worldly behavior on account of some awareness whose status as a valid cognition was not 
carefully examined first ascertain the validity of that awareness through the cognition of its result and further still 
those same people will not be sullied by doubts in their performing common behavior such as action with regard to 
awarenesses of the type under discussion which have arisen and exist.” tatra etat syāt dvividhā hi pravṛttiḥ ādyā ca 
ābhyāsikī ca. tatra ādyā yathā vinihitasalilāvasiktamasṛṇamṛdi śarāve śālyādibījaśaktiparīkṣaṇāya 
katipayabījakaṇāvāparūpā. tatas teṣām aṅkurakaraṇakauśalam avikalam avalokayantaḥ kīnāśā niḥśaṅkaṃ kedāreṣu 
tāni bījāny āvapanti iti seyam ābhyāsikī pravṛttiḥ. evam iha api prathamam aparīkṣitapramāṇabhāvād eva jñānāt 
kutaścit kaścid vipaścid api vyavahāram ārabhya  phalajñānena tasya prāmāṇyam avagacchan punas tathāvidhe jāte 
sati sukham eva pravṛttyādivyavahāram aśaṅkitakāluṣyaḥ kariṣyati iti. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the 
Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 535(28).13-534(29).8. 
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or failure and so determine whether it was valid or not.98 With this point in mind Jayanta’s 
preference for uncertainty in our daily lives over questions of intrinsic or extrinsic validity 
should be taken as uncertainty pro tem and not absolute.99 On this account, the rigor with which 
the validity of our everyday awarenesses should be judged is quite minimal when compared to 
those concerning transcendent matters. 
 As we have already seen, Jayanta is committed to the idea that once the distinction 
between validity and invalidity is admitted verification is necessary and so absolute uncertainty 
in our everyday practice cannot be endorsed by him. What then is Jayanta’s account of our 
worldly epistemology and how does he differentiate it from our transcendent epistemology? 
Jayanta begins by explaining why we should not accept the argument that validity is determined 
as the cognition is arising as follows:   
If we were to determine the validity of a cognition right as it is being brought 
forth then we, as we are acting, could never be deceived but we are deceived 
[sometimes]. Thus we should think [instead] that validity is not determined as the 
cognition is being brought forth, [and so] we carry out our action on the basis on 
suspicion exclusively.100 
For Jayanta it is not right to claim that validity is intrinsic or even that validity is determined as 
the cognition arises. Thus validity in our daily lives can only be certified as a result of our 
success when we act on the basis of the awareness in question. This analysis of verification 
removes the possibility that cognitions can be counted as valid as they arise, since then there 
                                                          
98. As discussed earlier on p.p. 44 n88. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa 
Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 512(51).9-11. kālāntare tu prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ satyam asti, na tu tatra nairapekṣyam, 
pravṛttisāmarthyādhīnatvāt tanniścayasya. 
99. As I have just discussed on the preceding page and footnote, even this formulation may be too strict 
since Jayanta seems to accept a somewhat more aloof stance with regard to the situation than he openly expresses. 
That is to say, it is obvious that some ordinary occurrences are not uncertain for Jayanta because they are 
consistently reestablished by our practical success in dealing with them, e.g. seeds.  
100. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
520(43).14-519(44).1. yadi prasavasamaya eva jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ niścinuyāmah, tarhi tataḥ pravartamānā na 
kvacid api vipralabhyemahi, vipralabhyāmahe tu. tena manyāmahe – “na niścitaṃ tadā pramāṇyaṃ, saṃśayād eva 
vyavaharama iti. 
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would be no such thing as perceptual error, but they also cannot be counted as invalid as they 
arise, since then action would be impossible. Instead, as Jayanta explains in the last sentence, we 
carry out action on the basis of suspicion. But wouldn’t this account of cognition be contradicted 
by the phenomenology of experience. Since, as the opponent points out, in the case of accurate 
perception and perceptual error the first awareness of the object is not experienced as being 
suspicious or doubtful but instead just presents its object in the form ‘this is x’ even if it is not 
actually x.101  Jayanta unequivocally rejects this claim. For him, there are only three possible 
characters that a cognition could have and, as far as he is concerned, two of them have already 
been shown to be inappropriate at the time a cognition arises, i.e. validity and invalidity, and so 
the only option is that they are suspicious or doubtful. Thus, Jayanta explains: 
This awareness which grasps one of two alternatives falls into the category of 
suspicion by force because there is no way to determine [its] validity [at that 
time]. In the same way that the Buddhists think “there is water in the well” so the 
perception “there is silver,” which grasps one alternative is, at that time, in fact 
just a suspicion.102 
As Jayanta points out the character of suspicion has nothing to do with the way that the cognition 
seems to the knower. Rather it is postulated by two simple facts: firstly, by the fact that there is 
no way to determine whether or not the cognition is valid at the time it arises and secondly, by 
                                                          
101. Here I have chosen to render the term ‘saṃśaya’ as both suspicion and doubt in order to address the 
similarity and ambiguity of the term. As the term is developed in the Nyāya tradition preceding Jayanta it is clear 
that the term means something more like doubt insofar as they frequently express the content of a doubt as being of 
the form ‘is that x or not x?’ but as I will suggest Jayanta’s usage would probably be better rendered as suspicion 
since it is not negative in character but rather investigatory. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya 
Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 519(44).3-4. nanu saṃśayo 'pi tadā na anubhūyata eva “kim idaṃ 
rajatam uta na rajatam” iti. api tu “rajatam” ity eva pratītiḥ.  
102. The reference to Buddhism here is striking and seems to come from an anonymous commentary on the 
Nyāyabinduṭīkā, known as the Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇa, which is no longer extant in Sanskrit and only exists in 
Tibetan. The point here is to emphasize the status of awarenesses that are not confirmed by action but that one has 
good reason to suspect are correct. For example, that there is water in a well which has not had water drawn from it. 
Thus, these types of awareness seem to fall into the domain of probabilistic knowledge. We will have occasion to 
return to the NBṬ in Part III. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's 
Nyāyamañjarī,” 519(44).7-9. ekataragrāhy apy ayaṃ pratyayah tanniścayopāyavirahāt saṃśayakoṭipatita eva balād 
bhavati yathā asti kūpe jalamiti bhiksyavo manyante.  
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the fact that the relevant productive factors of suspicion or doubt are present.103 Thus, the 
situation the knower finds herself or himself in is as follows: the knower must verify their 
awareness but cannot do so at that time and so, even if the awareness seems accurate or does not 
seem suspicious, the awareness is actually a suspicion which motivates the knower to verify its 
content according to Jayanta.  
Jayanta is here echoing earlier discussions of doubt found in his tradition, although he 
does so somewhat innovatively. Jayanta, building on the two situational factors just outlined, i.e. 
the inability to verify and the presence of the proper conditions for suspicion, explains that since 
the thing under consideration is an awareness we know that it can be either valid or invalid and if 
the specific features which demonstrate its validity cannot be perceived, which Jayanta has 
repeatedly claimed is impossible at the time the cognition arises—even if the awareness is 
presented to us as being a certain way—it necessarily brings to mind the alternate character and 
so becomes a doubt or suspicion. To provide an example, the perception of an object in the 
distance which is of the right height and shape to be either a man or a post produces a doubt in 
our minds about its identity if we cannot perceive any of the particular characteristics which 
would rule out one of the alternatives. This is even the case if our first awareness feels definitive, 
e.g. if it has the content “there is a man in the distance.”104 What Jayanta has done here is worth 
noting. At the most fundamental level he has taken one type of doubt articulated by his 
                                                          
103. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
518(45).2-4. niścayanimittasya tadānīm avidyamānatvāt saṃśayajananahetoś ca sāmagryāḥ sannihitatvāt.  
104. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
518(45).4-8. tathā hi yathārthetarabodhasādharaṇo dharmo bodharūpatvam ūrdhvatvādivat tadā prakāśata eva. na ca 
prāmāṇyāvinābhavī viśeṣaḥ kaś cana tadānīm avabhāti. tadagrahaṇe ca samānadharmādhigamaprabodhyamāna-
vāsanādhīnatatsahacaritaparyāyānubhūtaviśeṣasmṛtir api saṃbhavaty eveti īyaṃ sā saṃśayajananī sāmagrī sannihitā 
eva iti kathaṃ tajjanyaḥ saṃśayaḥ na syāt. Also for doubt in Nyāya, excluding Jayanta, see Prabhal Kumar Sen, 
“Saṃśaya” In Philosophical Concepts Relevant to Sciences in Indian Tradition, Vol. 1. Edited by Pranab Kumar 
Sen. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006) 243-256. Esp. 245 for what I have referred to here. And J.N. Mohanty, 
“Nyāya Theory of Doubt” In Phenomenology and Ontology. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) 198-219. 
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predecessors and applied it to cognition itself instead of to the object of that cognition, as his 
predecessors do. That is to say, by understanding the inability to validate our cognitions pro tem 
as the inability to ascertain the particular characteristics which differentiate accurate from 
inaccurate cognition Jayanta is able to explain how even seemingly accurate awarenesses are 
actually doubtful until they are verified. The example used by Jayanta is employed to show that 
the character of the awareness ‘there is silver’ really is the same as the cognition that ‘there is 
water in the well’. This point is used to reflect our regular epistemic practices. People have 
cognitions of this variety all the time but until the cognition’s validity is substantiated by, for 
example, drawing water from the well the cognition is not actually valid according to Jayanta 
and instead remains doubtful or suspicious. Thus, for Jayanta all cognitions in the worldly 
domain are naturally doubtful or suspicious until they are proven or disproven.  
The ability to prove cognition in the worldly domain is accomplished by our capacity for 
action (pravṛttisāmarthya) according to Jayanta. As already pointed out, this method of 
verification is meant to reflect the ordinary behavior of practically rational individuals and in 
discussing this theory Jayanta refers to an earlier commentary in his tradition to explicate the 
term. He explains: 
By Vātsyāyana, the writer of the commentary, saying “it is said that action 
(pravṛtti) means striving after, while the capacity (sāmarthya) for striving after is 
the connection with the result,” he means that the capacity for action is just the 
cognition of the result called pragmatic effectiveness (arthakriyā).105 
In this short passage Jayanta has glossed an established term in his tradition with one borrowed 
from the Buddhism. The concept of pragmatic effectiveness (arthakriyā) maintains that an 
awareness is valid “if any activity that we undertake on the basis of it could, in principle, lead us 
                                                          
105. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
510(53).5-7. bhāṣyakṛtā eva “samīhā pravṛttir ity ucyate, sāmarthyaṃ punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ” iti 
vadatārthakriyākhyaphalajñānam eva pravṛttisāmarthyam iti.  
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to results consistent with the expectations we form on the basis of it.”106 The fact that Jayanta 
unabashedly borrows this term is of interest and will be addressed in the final part of this paper 
but for the time being it is important to examine how this concept works in Jayanta’s 
epistemology. Jayanta explains the character of verification in worldly affairs as follows: 
Since it is seen that the first cognition of water incites action with respect to 
mirages even though there is no water present thus people doubt in such instances. 
But for someone who is in the middle of water the cognition of pragmatic 
effectiveness arises which is inseparable from the water and thus there is no 
doubt. [Additionally] there is no examination of the validity of the cognition of 
pragmatic effectiveness because there is no doubt and examination is preceded by 
doubt.107 
As already outlined, the occurrence of suspicion or doubt is the result of an awareness which 
perceives a similarity or common property in its object while failing to ascertain the particular 
characteristics which distinguish one of the possible objects which possess that common property 
from the others. Thus, the fact that we have been motivated to act by cognitions which were false 
produces the need for verification. But, as Jayanta explains, this need for verification is absent 
when the object or purpose we hope to attain is already satisfying our pragmatic needs. 
Additionally, the satisfaction of our intentions amounts to the apprehension of the particular 
characteristics of validity and so suspicion does not arise and as a result neither does the need, or 
even opportunity, for examination. 
 Jayanta’s theory of verification concerning worldly objectives reflects the lower, indeed 
extremely low, epistemic standards of truth dictated by the relatively low stakes of most of what 
                                                          
106. Lawrence McCrea & Parimal Patil, Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India: Jñānaśrīmitra on 
Exclusion. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 12. Also I have borrowed the expression ‘pragmatic 
effectiveness’ from McCrea & Patil. 
107. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
509(54).7-11. pravartakaṃ hi prathamam udakajñānam avidyamāne ‘pi nīre mihiramarīciṣu dṛṣṭam iti tatra 
saṃśerate janāḥ. arthakriyājñānaṃ tu salilamadhyartināṃ bhavat tadavinābhūtam eva bhavati iti na tatra saṃśayaḥ. 
tadabhāvān na tatprāmāṇyavicāraḥ, vicārasya saṃśayapūrvakatvāt. 
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we do on a day-to-day basis. However, this form of verification clearly cannot be used when the 
concern is for religious purposes where the stakes are very high and once we are able to resort to 
the experience of our success or failure in such practices it is already too late. So how does 
Jayanta account for the validity of the Veda? For Jayanta, as well as for the Mīmāṃsakas, the 
Veda embodies a kind of verbal testimony. As we saw, Mīmāṃsā attempts to establish this by 
explicating its non-difference from the other instruments of knowledge, perception etc. That is to 
say, insofar as all cognition is accepted as intrinsically valid, verbal testimony is included in that 
category. Thus, the Veda is valid because it produces awarenesses and cannot, according to 
Mīmāṃsā, ever be overturned. Jayanta takes another approach to the analysis of testimony and 
instead claims that testimony is valid because it is communicated by an exceptionally reliable 
authority, i.e. God. Jayanta claims that the unique character of God as the creator of the world 
and so forth provides him with direct experience of supersensible objects, such as dharma, and 
so warrants his authority with regard to such things.108 Thus, the validity of the Veda depends on 
Jayanta’s proof of God. Jayanta begins by stating that God is unique in the following ways: 
The individual creator of the Veda is not just anyone, but rather the highest lord 
capable of creating the triple world. He is God, he is the highest, he is the knower, 
whose bliss is eternal, who is compassionate, [and] free from the touch of the 
ripening of bad action and so forth.109  
Jayanta here is describing the type of extraordinary divinity which he believes is capable of 
creating the diverse world. As with many arguments for the existence of God, Jayanta basically 
presents a type of argument from intelligent design. 
                                                          
108. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 東洋文化研
究所紀要/The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture 148 (2005):  357(58). 
109. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 348(67).4-7. 
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 While Jayanta will emphasize that the complex structure of the world is very important in 
his inference for God’s role as the creator, he also relies heavily on the pre-established theories 
of inference in South Asia to do this. In his first articulation of his inference for the existence of 
God Jayanta states: 
But, we say that the inferential sign with respect to the existence of God is 
generalized from everyday occurrence (sāmānyatodṛṣṭa)—[for example] the 
property bearer, such as earth, is an effect, and the property to be proven is the 
fact that it is preceded by an intelligent creator who had a purpose in the kind of 
production of it, because of being an effect like a pot.110 
Here Jayanta is employing traditional Nyāya type of inference known as sāmānyatodṛṣṭa which 
is “said to work on the basis of knowledge of common characteristics… [and] has a conclusion 
that is in fact not known by current perception, like all inferences, but also, unlike the other 
varieties [of inference], an imperceptible conclusion.” For example, according to the tradition, 
the inference that the sun moves because we perceive that its position has changed on the basis 
of the observation that things generally change places by moving is a sāmānyatodṛṣṭa 
inference.111 For this inference to be sāmānyatodṛṣṭa it must have a conclusion that is 
imperceptible and so we must to assume that the Naiyāyika, a follower of the Nyāya tradition, 
asserts that the movement of the sun is imperceptible. Thus, the world has an intelligent creator 
because it is an effect and effects are created like pots. The imperceptible conclusion here is the 
intelligent creator, i.e. God, and the common characteristic is the fact that effects are created by 
intelligent creators. 
                                                          
110. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 336(79).4-7. 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ tu liṅgam īśvarasattāyām idaṃ brūmahe—pṛthivyādi kāryaṃ dharmi, 
tadutpattiprakāraprayojanādyabhijñakartṛpūrvakam iti sādhyo dharmaḥ, kāryatvāt ghaṭādivat. 
111. Stephen Phillips, Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge sources of the Nyāya School. (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 157 n28.  
 
 
58 
 
 For Jayanta the paradigm example is a pot since they are effects they are created and we 
never see them arise without an intelligent creator, i.e. an intelligent creator is part of a pots 
totality of causal factors. But more importantly for Jayanta’s inference to hold all effects must 
have an intelligent creator as their cause since otherwise, someone could simply state the counter 
example that the world is not created because it is an effect which would nullify both inferences. 
This critique amounts to the logical fault in South Asian inference theory known as deviation 
(vyabhicāra) which indicates that the inferential sign, in this case being an effect, is not always 
pervaded by being created by an intelligent creator and so fails.112 For example, in the inference 
“there is a fire on the mountain because there is smoke there,” smokiness is pervaded by fieriness 
such that there is no instance of smoke without fire. The 6th century Buddhist philosopher 
Dignāga further developed this intuition by claiming that the inferential sign or reason must 
conform to a three-fold scheme or test (trairūpyahetu) to warrant valid inferences: it must exist 
in the locus of the inference (pakṣa), it must exist in at least one similar case (sapakṣa), and it 
must not exist in any counter-cases (vipakṣa).113 Thus, the inference that there is fire on the 
mountain is valid if and only if there actually is smoke on the mountain, smoke exists in at least 
one similar instance where there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen, and smoke never exist where there is no 
fire, e.g. under water. When this three-fold test is applied to Jayanta’s inference a problem arises 
since there are other instance of effects which are not created by an intelligent agent and so the 
inferential reason, i.e. being an effect, deviates from the thing to be proved, i.e. being created by 
an intelligent agent. 
                                                          
112. Ibid, 171.  
113. Richard Hayes, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1988) 145-148. Esp. 146-147.  
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 According to the requirement that the inferential reason meet the three-fold test Jayanta’s 
inference fails. In order to understand how Jayanta tries to escape this problem we must return to 
Dignāga. In Dignāga’s formulation of inferential reasoning he was highly influenced by what 
might be called the social or argumentative side of inference, that is to say inference used in 
debate with others.114 According to this tradition it is a logical requirement that the thing to be 
proven by the inference and the inferential reason used are accepted by both parties in a 
debate.115 Thus, one cannot use disputed cases as evidence, i.e. examples which are in the pakṣa, 
for an inference. Thus, if the opponent points out that there are things which are effects which we 
see are not created by an intelligent agent, e.g. trees etc., in an attempt to establish the existence 
of the inferential reason, i.e. being an effect, in a dissimilar case (vipakṣa), i.e. where there is 
effect-hood without having an intelligent creator, then how can Jayanta respond? Jayanta here 
makes use of the argumentative character of debate and claims that this is not an appropriate 
counter example (vipakṣa) because he includes such examples in the property he hopes to prove 
(sādhya) and so it is part of the domain of dispute (pakṣa) and cannot be used as evidence against 
him.116 Additionally, one cannot deny this by resorting to perception since, for Jayanta, one of 
the qualities of God is in-corporeality and so the example of trees etc., which are effects which 
are not seen to be created by an intelligent agent but are seen to grow, simply cannot be used as a 
counter example.117 Accordingly, for Jayanta, there is no effect whatsoever which is not created 
                                                          
114. Ibid.  
115. A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism. 2nd Edition. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 461. 
116. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 331(84).13-
14. yad api vyabhicārodbhāvanaṃ akṛṣṭajātaiḥ sthāvarādibhir akāri, tad api na cāru, teṣāṃ pakṣīkṛtatvāt. 
117. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 330(85).11-
13. adṛśyasya ca kartur anupalabdhito nāstitvaniścayānupapatteḥ na akṛṣṭajātavanaspatīnām akartṛkatvam iti na 
vipakṣatā. 
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by God and so every effect for him is part of the property to be proved and so cannot be used as 
evidence against his inference. 
 The type of framework this type of dispute-based-inference produces seems to be 
excessively strong, since presumably we could put any piece of counter evidence into the domain 
under dispute and so infer anything. This clearly cannot be accepted by Jayanta so the question 
arises, how can Jayanta delimit how and when a disputant is warranted in subsuming a piece of 
counter evidence into the domain under dispute? His answer is as follows: 
If you can [definitively] demonstrate [something’s] existence in a determined 
counter example, who could include that in the domain of dispute? Since when 
[someone] is urging [that there is the logical fault of] deviation for masculinity 
with respect to Brahmin-hood or for being cognizable with respect to eternality 
even the creator cannot accept the counter example as [being within] the domain 
of dispute, since the world does not align with the desires of the disputant. But in 
this case it is not definitively demonstrated that there is no creator with respect to 
such things as plants so it is said.118 
Here Jayanta is presumably appealing to supposedly indubitable facts about reality. For Jayanta 
these are facts that even the creator cannot call into question. Thus, the fact that being a man 
does not inconclusively imply Brahmin-hood seems to be one fact that Jayanta believes is 
constitutive of the way the world is and so can always be appealed to as counter evidence.119 
Presumably, Jayanta is saying that there are some men in the world who we unequivocally know 
are not Brahmins and that this is a fact even God cannot doubt. If this interpretation is correct 
Jayanta seems to rely on at least some foundational truths which are meant to ground inference in 
reality as such. However, this move seems less than convincing. To begin with, Jayanta gives us 
                                                          
118. Kataoka, “Critical Edition of the Īśvarasiddhi Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī,” 329(86).11-
328(87).1. yadi hi bhavān niścite vipakṣe vṛttim upadarśayet kas taṃ pakṣe 'ntarbhāvayet. na vipratve puṃstvasya 
nityatāyāṃ vā prameyatvasya vyabhicāre codyamāne vedhasā api vipakṣaḥ pakṣīkartuṃ śakyaḥ, vādīcchayā 
vastuvyavasthāyā abhāvāt. iha tu sthāvarādau kartrabhāvaniścayo nāsti ity uktam. 
119. Brahmins are one of the four traditionally recognized social castes in pre-modern South Asia and are 
frequently said to be the most spiritually and physically pure. Thus, Brahmins serve particular purposes in South 
Asian society which is more prestigious than the other three castes. 
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no reason to accept his assertion that these facts are indubitable but instead simply stipulates it. 
Also, as previously discussed, Jayanta’s worldly epistemology functions on a verification 
scheme which requires one to act before verification is attained. For this reason it seems like 
Jayanta will have some difficulty moving from the pragmatic verification behavior he sees in our 
day-to-day lives to the type of certainty he wants to grant the Veda inferentially. It seems as 
though Jayanta must offer some explanation of how this is possible but he seems to be mostly 
silent on the topic. One point of reference which may help to support his trust in certain ordinary 
perceptual inputs as foundations for stable valid inferences is Jayanta’s belief that conditioned 
regular perceptual occurrences are more well founded for the knower than ones that have never 
been perceived or have been but only once or twice. With this point in mind we might say that 
Jayanta could conceivably introduce some level of stability into his theory of inference but I 
would argue this would still not produce the pedigree of inference Jayanta both wants and needs 
for his inference of the existence of God.  
Jayanta’s difficulty accounting for how these two distinct domains of epistemology can 
be related to one another and thus connected encourages the consideration of his success in 
securing the higher-level epistemic certainty he demands of Kumārila. As I have argued it seems 
that there is an essential difference in the way that Kumārila and Jayanta conceptualize the needs 
and requirements of the knower and apparently fundamentally diverge in their understanding of 
the term validity (prāmāṇya). In some respects the essential difference between the two writers 
concerns the relative weight they place on the possibility of error and defeaters in their 
epistemologies. While Kumārila sees the occurrence of error and defeaters as always possible he 
asserts that this fact does not undermine the everyday justification of our experiences and so 
claims that the burden of proof, or more appropriately disproof, does not belong to the knower. 
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Conversely Jayanta asserts that the possibility of error and defeaters necessitates the 
determination of the accuracy of our beliefs, whether this comes in the form of pragmatic 
effectiveness in the case of most worldly engagement or in the form indubitable testimony 
underpinned by inference in the case of transcendent domains of knowledge, and so sees the 
burden of proof resting on the knower. The most significant difficulty Jayanta’s account of 
scriptural authority presents is solely dependent on his seemingly under-developed articulation of 
how exactly we move from the rough-and-ready epistemic practices of daily life to the absolutely 
certain testimony of God via scripture. As we have seen there are at least two relevant points that 
indicate how Jayanta might conceive of this process—i.e. the higher-level stability of 
conditioned occurrences and the supposed indubitability of certain facts, e.g. that not all men are 
of the Brahmin caste—but neither of these points are significantly developed by Jayanta and are 
simply mentioned in passing. Thus, Jayanta’s overarching epistemology is left in need of further 
articulation and development which does not seem to be present anywhere in his discussion of 
the topic. 
3. DOUBT BEYOND JAYANTA 
3.1. Nyāya Articulations of Doubt & Inquiry 
So far I have attempted two things in this paper: firstly, I have tried to take up one 
philosophical position as articulated in its tradition and examine how that position was 
interpreted, attacked and dismissed, secondly, I have tried to draw attention to the intellectual 
historical dimension of these developments and engagements in the broader context of South 
Asian philosophy. From what has been discussed up to now the second objective is most readily 
apparent in Part I’s discussion of how the theory of intrinsic validity was developed and refined 
over time but it is also present in Jayanta’s assessment and critique of the theory itself. I would 
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now like to examine Jayanta’s epistemology somewhat retrospectively by drawing attention to 
how Jayanta relates to his own tradition of Nyāya and builds on another South Asian 
philosophical tradition, namely Buddhism. Specifically, I am interested in Jayanta’s deployment 
of doubt or suspicion as an epistemic category at the foundation of all worldly behavior and 
where and how he is influenced and innovative in this respect. In the following discussion I will 
draw attention to pre-Jayanta discussions of doubt found in Nyāya, focusing on how doubt is 
conceived of as well as how it relates to what we have seen in Jayanta. Next I want to address 
how the 8th century Kashmirian Buddhist Dharmottara employs the concept of doubt as a 
potential source for Jayanta’s later discussion of the same topic. Broadly I will argue that while 
Jayanta’s presentation of doubt bears some similarity to both Nyāya and Buddhist discussions of 
the term his articulation is ultimately more consistent with those of found in the Buddhist 
tradition.  
Jayanta, as part of the brahmanical tradition of Nyāya, is concerned with the attainment 
of liberation from cyclic existence and so builds on his tradition and predecessors in this 
respect.120 According to the source text of the tradition, The Aphorisms of Nyāya (Nyāyasūtra), 
Nyāya is concerned with the following: 
Leading to achievement of the supreme good is knowledge according to reality: 1) 
of the means of right knowledge (pramāṇa), 2) of the objects of right knowledge 
(prameya), 3) of doubt (saṃśaya), 4) of motivation (prayojana), 5) of example 
(dṛṣṭānta), 6) of established doctrine (siddhānta), 7) of the members of inference 
(avayava), 8) of hypothetical reasoning (tarka), 9) of definitive ascertainment 
(nirṇaya), 10) of [loyal] debate (vāda), 11) of diatribe (jalpa), 12) of quibbles 
(vitaṇḍa), 13) of fallacious logical reasoning (hetvābhāsa), 14) of deliberate 
distortion [of contrary theses] (chala), 15) of futile rejoinder (jāti), 16) of the 
points of immobilisation [sic] (nigrahasthāna).121[Torrela] 
                                                          
120. By cyclic existence I mean the belief in birth, death and rebirth which is shared by most intellectual 
and religious traditions in pre-modern South Asia.  
121. Rafaelle Torrela. The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal, translated by Kenneth 
Frederick Hurry. (Varanasi: Indica Books, 2011) 41. 
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As even a cursory glance at this rather dense and technical sūtra will show the tradition of Nyāya 
is concerned broadly with the science of inquiry and its relation to liberation. While the topics 
Nyāya is concerned with include epistemological as well as ontological ones, and especially the 
categorization of debate, what is of particular importance for our purposes are the first three 
topics: the valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa), their objects (prameya), and doubt (saṃśaya). 
It is relatively easy to understand the inclusion of the first two members of the list when 
considering the purpose Nyāya hopes to achieve—indeed it seems rather straightforward that a 
tradition attempting to articulate a framework of inquiry which culminates in liberating 
knowledge would make some mention of both how knowledge is gained and those entities which 
fall under its purview—but the mention of doubt in this list is somewhat less clear. Primarily, the 
inclusion of doubt provides two functions in the tradition preceding Jayanta and in the following 
pages an attempt will be made to explicate both.122 The first is the role that the proper 
understanding and articulation of doubt as a kind of awareness plays in understanding the 
different types of awareness and the second is the role that doubt plays in the act of inquiry 
generally. 
 In the characteristic style of the NS the discussion of the topics under consideration in the 
entire text generally follows, only with some special exceptions, the same pattern of presentation 
of the 16 categories that was found in sūtra 1.1.1 just quoted, i.e. first, the valid means of 
knowledge will be discussed followed by their objects etc. Thus, after the first 22 sūtras in the 
first book which cover the valid means of knowledge and their objects the definition of doubt is 
presented. Sūtra 1.1.23 states: 
                                                          
122. Actually, according to Vātsyāyana, the writer of the oldest extant commentary on the NS, the inclusion 
of doubt in this list is the defining feature of Nyāya which sets it apart from scriptural texts which also teach the 
means to liberation, i.e. the Upaniṣads which are a subsection of the Veda. Kataoka, “Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on the purpose 
of Nyāya,” 151-153.  
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Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific 
character of any one object is wanting, and which arises either—(A) from the 
cognition of the character common to the objects concerned, or (B) from the 
cognition of the characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, 
or (C) from the presence of contradictory opinions;—and the appearing of such 
wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-
perceptions.123[Jha] 
This sūtra differentiates doubt from other forms of awareness and explains that there are three 
varieties of doubt.124 While the types of doubt receive significant discussion in the tradition and 
are a topic of disagreement between authors, for our purposes only the first type of doubt will be 
discussed. As it should be readily apparent, it is this type of doubt which Jayanta applies to 
cognition itself in order to claim that all awareness, even though it does not seem so, is really 
doubtful in character. Since our awarenesses always arise from the cognition of the common 
character of awareness, i.e. the fact that it has the form of an awareness (bodharūpatva), and 
because we are unable to ascertain the specific characteristics of awareness which would 
differentiate those awarenesses that are valid from those that are invalid before we act, therefore, 
all awareness is doubtful at the outset. As I have already mentioned, while this type of doubt is 
already addressed by Jayanta’s predecessors it is not applied to awareness itself. For example, in 
the earliest extant commentary on the NS—The Commentary on the Aphorisms of Nyaya 
(Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya)—the author Vātsyāyana only discusses this type of doubt in terms of 
external objects, e.g. when someone doubts whether the object in the distance is a human or a 
post.125 Thus, Vātsyāyana’s account of this type of doubt emphasizes different factors which 
                                                          
123. Ganganath Jha. The Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārttika of 
Uddyotakara. Volume 1 reprint. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984) 299. 
124. This is the most natural reading of the sūtra even though historically there was some discussion and 
argument about exactly how many types of doubt there are. For example, Vātsyāyana claims there are five while 
Uddyotakara claims three. For a discussion of this see esp. Sen, 244-248. 
125. NSBh in ND, 235.4-240.2. samānadharmopapatter viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśaya iti. sthāṇupuruṣayoḥ 
samānaṃ dharmam ārohapariṇāhau paśyan pūrvadṛṣṭaṃ ca tayor viśeṣam bubhutsamānaḥ kiṃsvid ity anyataraṃ 
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contribute to the production of a given awareness and not to the mechanism of awarenesses 
irrespective of external factors. For this reason I would like to suggest that Jayanta is presenting 
an introspective kind of doubt which is distinct from the more ordinary experiential types of 
doubt discussed by his predecessors. This allows us to explain why Jayanta’s discussion of doubt 
need not feel doubtful to the person having the doubt while all previous discussion of the topic 
clearly emphasize this feature. 
Two interesting differences between Jayanta’s articulation of doubt in our everyday 
epistemic practices and, for example, Vātsyāyana’s discussion of the first type of doubt is the 
role played by memory in the process and the phenomenology of doubt. That is to say, we can 
ask two questions of Vātsyāyana that we have already implicitly addressed in Jayanta, what is 
the role of memory in the production of this type of doubt and is it still doubt if it is not 
experienced as doubtful to the person having the experience? As we have already seen, Jayanta 
claims that the fact that we know or have experienced that there are accurate and inaccurate 
awarenesses necessitates verification and the search for verification is instigated by doubt, even 
if a particular awareness is not experienced as doubtful in character. But on Vātsyāyana’s 
account, is the fact that we have experienced a common characteristic enough to produce doubt 
or does one have to recollect that experience in each individual case? According to Vātsyāyana 
recollection is essential to the production of doubt since without it one simply apprehends the 
object incompletely albeit confidently. That is to say, if someone fails to recollect the specific 
characteristics that would differentiate the potential objects of the awareness then doubt does not 
arise. For example, if someone perceives an object of a particular height and width in the 
                                                          
nāvadhārayati, tadanavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ. “samānam anayor dharmam upalabhe viśeṣam anyatarasya na 
upalabha” ity eṣā buddhir apekṣā—saṃśayasya pravṛttikā vartate, tena viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ.  
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distance and fails to recollect the specific characteristics which differentiate humans from posts 
then the doubt “is this a human or a post?” does not arise according to Vātsyāyana. This is 
because doubt is “a wavering judgement of [something] which possesses a common 
characteristic [which is produced] from the apprehension of the common characteristic which 
depends on the recollection of particular characteristic.”126 While there is some divergence in the 
opinions of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara—Uddyotakara being the author of the only extant 
commentary on Vātsyāyana’s text, i.e. The Critical Commentary on Nyāya (Nyāyavārttika)—on 
the exact mechanism and types of doubt, both agree that recollection plays an important role in 
doubt’s production and that doubts are experienced as doubtful. 
The emphasis on how doubt arises as well as its character presents the first indication of 
how pre-Jayanta Nyāya conceptualizes the role of doubt or suspicion in inquiry. This discussion 
turns on the understanding of doubt as a kind of wavering or oscillating judgement. As we have 
just seen doubt is explicitly glossed as a wavering judgement in sūtra 23 and, while Vātsyāyana 
does not discuss the term in this section of his commentary, Uddyotakara explains that “a 
wavering judgement (vimarśa) considers various objects, [since] it is as if doubt, i.e. uncertainty, 
touches both [its] objects.”127 Thus, doubt involves at least two alternatives and oscillates 
between them in such a way that each is entertained in turn but not accepted until the particular 
characteristic which decides the state of affairs has been ascertained. As such, Nyāya claims that 
doubt holds an important position in the framework of inquiry. For example, Vātsyāyana claims 
                                                          
126. Here Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara disagree on the meaning of the compound ‘viśeṣāpekṣa.’ 
Uddyotakara takes in the sense translated in the sūtra, i.e. judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific 
character of any one object is wanting, while emphasizes that doubt depends on the recollection of the particular 
characteristics. The term ‘wavering judgement’ is a translation of ‘vimarśa’ borrowed from Jha, 299. NSBh in ND, 
255.1-2. samānadharmādhigamāt samānadharmopapatter viśeṣasmṛtyapekṣo vimarśa iti. 
127. NV in ND, 239.12-13. nānārthāvamarśaṇam vimarśaḥ. ubhau arthau mṛśati iva saṃśītiḥ saṃśayaḥ.  
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that “Nyāya does not function with regard to things that are not known or with regard to things 
that are already known, rather it functions with regard to those things that are doubtful.”128 
Here we get the first indication of how doubt figures in the larger picture of Nyāya, that is to say 
Nyāya is concerned only with those topics that are doubtful in character. 
The theory and function of doubt is at the heart of Nyāya’s investigative methodology; 
the correct articulation of doubt as a kind of awareness and its role in inquiry is essential to the 
purpose of Nyāya. But how exactly this investigative doubt arises and what type of inquiry is at 
stake in the more traditional accounts of investigation need to be addressed at greater length. The 
concept of hypothetical or suppositional reasoning (tarka) is essential to the presentation of a 
more exhaustive account of doubt as it features in Nyāya’s methodology.129 To begin with, after 
presenting the first 7 topics of Nyāya articulated in sūtra 1, sūtra 1.1.40 turns to the discussion of 
how hypothetical reasoning (tarka) is involved in inquiry, stating: 
When the real character of a thing is not well known, there is put forward, for the 
purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning (in support of a certain 
conclusion) which indicates the presence of proof (showing the undesirability or 
absurdity of a contrary conclusion);—and this is called ‘hypothetical 
reasoning.’130 [Jha] 
As hypothetical reasoning is presented here, it is a method of analysis applied to an uncertain 
topic, e.g. the proposition “everyone has a persistent soul.” According to Phillips, hypothetical 
reasoning “is called for in order to re-establish a presumption of truth in favor of one thesis that 
has putative source support against a rival thesis that also has putative source support.”131 Thus, 
                                                          
128. NSBh in ND, 35.5. tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kiṃ tarhi saṃśayite 'rthe.  
129. The translation of tarka as “hypothetical reasoning” is Jha’s, 37, while some more contemporary 
writers prefer the translation “suppositional reasoning.” e.g. Jonardon Ganeri. Philosophy in Classical India: An 
Introduction and Analysis. (London: Routledge, 2001) Esp. 151. & Phillips, 170. 
130. Jha, 445-446.  
131. Phillips, 30-31.  
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when entertaining a particular thesis hypothetical reasoning is employed to draw out or examine 
the implications of different accounts of that thesis. According to Vātsyāyana, when something is 
not understood fully we have a desire to know it and “then one considers (vimṛśati) the two 
contradictory characters [ascribed] to the thing being investigated separately [thinking] ‘is this 
thing like this or not?’”132 To provide the traditional example, hypothetical reasoning is used in 
Nyāya to demonstrate that there is a persistent soul (ātman). According to Vātsyāyana, 
somebody investigating whether the soul exists or not should entertain each option, i.e. the soul’s 
existence and non-existence, and draw out their implications in turn in order to see which is more 
consistent with the general understanding of the world, etc. On this account Vātsyāyana 
determines that the existence of a persistent soul should be accepted since one cannot account for 
how cyclic existence functions otherwise.133 Thus, hypothetical reasoning is the “drawing out of 
implications of opposed views and testing them against mutually accepted positions (siddhānta), 
according to, broadly speaking, criteria of coherence but also of simplicity.”134 Essential to this 
understanding of hypothetical reasoning is the motivation to consider (vimarśa), in turn, the 
mutually contradictory characters attributed to the same object.  
This type of oscillating consideration is also reflected in the next sūtra, sūtra 1.1.41, 
where definitive ascertainment (nirṇaya) is defined as “the clear determination of a thing having 
considered (vimṛśya), in turn, the case for that thing and the case against it.”135 This sūtra builds 
on the last one and explicates the result of hypothetical reasoning. In explaining how this 
statement should be interpreted Vātsyāyana explicitly brings our attention back to the role of 
                                                          
132. NSBh in ND, 320.5-321.3. atha jijñāsitasya vastuno vyāhatau dharmau vibhāgena vimṛśati, “kiṃsvid 
ittham āhosvin netham” iti.  
133. NS & NSBh in ND 1.1.40, 321.4-322.5.  
134. Phillips, 31.  
135. NS in ND, 329.2. vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ. 1.1.41 
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doubt in the process of inquiry. He begins by claiming that “here [in sūtra 41] consideration 
(vimarśa) means doubt (saṃśaya)… and doubt [in the form of the expression] “is this so?” is an 
uncertain awareness which merely considers a thing.”136 Thus, the essential role played by 
consideration in Vātsyāyana’s understanding of both hypothetical reasoning and definitive 
ascertainment should be understood as directly expressive of motivating doubt. As we have 
already seen the role of doubt was already tacitly mentioned in the previous sūtra following the 
desire to know the object and now we have a better sense of how doubt functions in investigation 
in general. Doubt is seen as the first step in inquiry since when someone resolves to gain 
understanding of some topic it is implied that there is the possibility that the thing under 
consideration could be a number of different ways and this fact produces the doubt or suspicion 
about which way it actually is. Thus, here doubt is not only essential to hypothetical reasoning 
but also to definitive ascertainment.  
At this point it is profitable to ask whether it is the case that doubt is integral in all 
definitive ascertainment. Importantly both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara clearly explains that it is 
not. For example, Vātsyāyana says: 
The sūtra ‘definitive ascertainment (nirṇaya) is the clear determination of a thing 
having considered (vimṛśya), in turn, the case for that thing and the case against 
it’ is not a restriction in [all] definitive ascertainment. For instance, definitive 
ascertainment in perception, which is produced from the connection of the object 
and the sense faculty, is [just] the clear determination of the object [without doubt 
figuring in the process.] But with regard to the topic under consideration (i.e. in 
the case of hypothetical reasoning) definitive ascertainment is the clear 
determination of a thing [only after] having considered, in turn, the case for that 
thing and the case against it.137 
                                                          
136. NSBh in ND, 35.7-8. vimarśaḥ, saṃśayaḥ… sa ca “ayaṃ kiṃsvid” iti vastuvimarśamātram 
anavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ. 
137. NSBh in ND, 330.13-15. na cāyaṃ nirṇaye niyamo vimṛśya eva pakṣapratipakṣābhyām 
arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇaya iti, kiṃ tv indriyārthasannikarṣotpannapratyakṣe 'rthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇaya iti, 
parīkṣāviṣaye tu vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ.  
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Thus, doubt or consideration motivated by suspicion is restricted to some forms of definitive 
ascertainment but not all. The mention of perception is important here, especially in relation to 
Jayanta. The kind of definitive ascertainment Nyāya is concerned with is broadly conceived and 
includes, for example, both the results of perceptual awareness and the conclusions which result 
from more hypothetical discussion and argumentation. But it is not the case, according to 
Vātsyāyana, that perception requires the kind of procedural doubt just outlined. Here Jayanta can 
be seen diverging from his predecessors once again. For Jayanta, all perceptual awareness is 
doubtful before it is validated by pragmatic success and so he explicitly disagrees with 
Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. However, Uddyotakara clarifies Vātsyāyana’s point in an 
important way, namely that “it is true that [being preceded by doubt] is not a restriction in [all] 
definite ascertainment. [But] it certainly is a restriction in investigation. Definite ascertainment 
may be [preceded by doubt] and it can be otherwise, [but] investigation is always preceded by 
doubt.”138 Uddyotakara is concerned that Vātsyāyana’s articulation of the situation obscures an 
important point that both authors want to stress, namely the necessary role of doubt in 
investigation, i.e. in the belief forming process. According to Uddyotakara, doubt is included in 
the NS precisely because it is a primary component in inquiry.139 Thus, the presentations of doubt 
and inquiry found in early Nyāya bears some similarity to Charles Peirce’s understanding of the 
role of doubt in the formation of belief. For example, Peirce claims that doubt “stimulates us to 
inquiry until it is destroyed” and that “the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of 
belief.”140 While the former point is explicitly stated by early Nyāya authors, as we have just 
                                                          
138. NV in ND, 407.9-408.8. na nirṇaye niyamaḥ. vicāre hi niyamaḥ. nirṇayaḥ evam ca anyathā ca. vicāraḥ 
saṃśayapūrvakaḥ eva. 
139. NV in ND, 255.14-256.8. saḥ ayam evambhūtaḥ saṃśayaḥ vicārāṅgatayā upādīyate.  
140. Peirce, Charles S. “The Fixation of Belief” In The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the 
Present, Edited by Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse. (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 41. 
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seen, the latter is more instructive for our interpretation of what has already been said about 
Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. To explain, we can understand doubt as articulated in the 
framework of hypothetical reasoning as a struggle to attain definitive ascertainment, not in the 
sense of knowledge, but rather in the sense of firm belief which is consistent with other pieces of 
knowledge. For this reason doubt can be seen as the initial step in incorporating a given 
proposition into a pre-existent set of beliefs which form a coherent system. It seems that this 
emphasis of belief also tracks with Peirce’s restriction that doubt is never the end goal, that it is 
destroyed once belief is attained. Additionally, it is important to note that inquiry, on both 
Vātsyāyana’s and Peirce’s account, does not produce knowledge, i.e. true belief, instead it 
merely produces beliefs that are, for the most part, consistent with our other beliefs.141 In fact 
this is the primary claim of hypothetical reasoning. It is a method of restoring beliefs which have 
been temporarily stripped of their putative source support and so demonstrating their coherence 
in the network of beliefs. 
 3.2 Dharmottara & Role of Doubt in the Opening of a Scientific Treatise 
 As has been shown so far, Jayanta’s understanding of doubt differs from that of his 
predecessors. Although the claim that doubt is the exclusive topic of Nyāya precedes Jayanta and 
so grounds his discussion of the subject in important ways he can also be seen breaking with the 
tradition as already mentioned. It is interesting to note that while such an intricate understanding 
and articulation of doubt pre-dates Jayanta in his own tradition he frequently refers to texts 
outside of the domain of Nyāya when discussing doubt. Primarily Jayanta relies on the 
discussion of doubt presented by the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara in his 
                                                          
141. Peirce, 42. 
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Commentary on the Drop of Reasoning (Nyāyabinduṭīkā).142 While the NBṬ is a commentary on 
an epistemological text the relevant section for our discussion of doubt actually takes place 
outside of the official presentation of epistemology and instead is meta-textual in character. That 
is to say, Dharmottara’s discussion of doubt is developed in his presentation of the text he is 
commenting upon and not on its content per se. Such an activity, growing out of the complex 
tradition of commentary in pre-modern South Asia, over time became rather standard in many 
texts and as Toru Funayama explains: 
When a treatise (śāstra) of great significance for the development of a 
philosophical system was composed in ancient India, each word of that treatise 
was read, digested and then often commented upon by its followers for centuries. 
Commentaries were not just elucidations of the passages of the mūla-texts (i.e. 
root text) but were records of theoretical expansion, interpretation and 
development at later periods. More often than not, commentaries were 
commenced by explaining the significance of the opening sentence (ādivākya) of 
the treatise. In that case, what was clarified first was the answers to the following 
questions: What is the subject matter (abhidheya) of the treatise?, What is the aim 
(prayojana) of the treatise?, What is the relation (sambandha) between the treatise 
and its aim?, and so on.143 
Thus, it is in Dharmottara’s discussion of the opening sentence (ādivākya) of Dharmakīrti’s NB 
that he articulates his understanding of doubt in relation to inquiry. It should be noted at the 
outset that Dharmottara’s presentation of doubt is also directly linked to its role in the process of 
inquiry and so bears some similarity to that of Nyāya, but it also should be noted that there are 
some important differences. As I have already noted, it is not the significant divergence between 
the two articulations of doubt which is of most interest here, but rather that, in spite of the fact 
that Jayanta had a pre-existing theory of doubt at his disposal, he clearly presents his own 
discussion of doubt with Buddhist texts in mind and not Nyāya ones. 
                                                          
142. The Drop of Reason (Nyāyabindu) is a text composed by the great 7th century Buddhist philosopher 
Dharmakīrti.  
143.  Toru Funayama. “Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kamalaśīla on the Aim of a Treatise 
(prayojana).” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens/Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, 39 (1995): 181. 
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 Dharmakīrti’s NB is modeled on the sūtra style of composition and so consists of a series 
of succinct statements outlining his presentation and understanding of the types of perception 
and inference. As previously mentioned the entirety of what will be discussed in the following is 
Dharmottara’s exhaustive presentation of the opening aphorism of the NB which states that “the 
establishment of all human aims is preceded by accurate cognition [and] thus accurate cognition 
is taught.”144 The sentence, according to Dharmottara, states both the purpose of the composition 
as well as its content.145 Thus, the subject matter of the NB is accurate cognition and the purpose 
of the text is its communication. According to Dharmottara the very fact that the composition of 
a scientific treatise is undertaken implies that the content of that text has a particular purpose 
“since, because there is no purpose for the teeth of a crow, the investigation of those teeth is not 
undertaken by a practically rational person (prekṣāvatā).”146 As we have previously seen the 
emphasis on the behavior of practically rational people (prekṣāvat) is a point Jayanta relies 
heavily upon in his epistemology, a method noticeably absent in the discussions of his 
predecessors. Additionally, Dharmottara explains that “all practically rational people act having 
set their sights on a [particular] purpose for that action.”147 That is to say, people act purposively 
according to Dharmottara and in connection with the NB, or with any scientific text generally, 
there are two distinct but relevant purposes.148 First there is the purpose of the writer of the text 
who hopes to instruct or teach and second there is the purpose of the student who will learn from 
                                                          
144. NB in NBP, 4.1. samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti tad vyutpādayate. 1.1. 
145. NBṬ in NBP, 4.6. samyagjñānapūrviketyādinā asya prakaraṇasya abhidheyaprayojanam ucyate.  
146. NBṬ in NBP, 6.8-10. abhidheyaṃ tu yadi niṣprayojanaṃ syāt, tadā tatpratipattaye śabdasandarbho 'pi 
nārambhaṇīyaḥ syāt. yathā kākadantaprayojanābhāvāt na tatparīkṣā ārambhaṇīyā prekṣāvatā. 
147. NBṬ in NBP, 7.12. sarve prekṣāvantaḥ pravṛttiprayojanam anviṣya pravartante. 
148. The term I am rendering as ‘scientific text’ is the Sanskrit term śāstra which should be distinguished 
from scripture, fiction, etc.    
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the text after it is composed.149 It is in respect to the second purpose, the purpose of the student, 
that Dharmottara formulates his discussion of doubt. 
 According to Dharmottara the natural state of affairs when addressing a text seems to 
build on earlier theoretical discussions of inquiry and knowledge in South Asia generally, since it 
is often stated in commentaries on South Asian scientific literature that we are frequently 
confronted with a paradox of inquiry. That is to say, we are confronted with a fundamental 
dilemma when inquiring after something, namely that if the topic is not known it cannot be 
approached at all and if it is already known there is no point in investigating it.150 Thus, even if 
the content and the purpose of the text are stated at the outset of the treatise, no one, no rational 
agent, Dharmottara argues, would read that text since they could not know that it achieves its 
purpose until they had finished it.151 As such the dilemma of inquiry is reflected in 
Dharmottara’s understanding of how people proceed in investigation and action since, on this 
account, no rational person would proceed to read a treatise which they did not know served a 
particular purpose and it would be purposeless for them to do so if they already knew. So how 
does one proceed according to Dharmottara? Firstly, he explains that it is true that one cannot 
know the contents of a text without reading it “but when a [particular] content, purpose, etc. are 
stated, even though they are not [yet] authenticated, a suspicion (saṃśaya) arises, and 
                                                          
149. NBṬ in NBP, 7.10-11. prayojane cātra vaktuḥ prakaraṇakaraṇavyāpārasya cintyete, śrotuś ca 
śravaṇavyāpārasya. I have amended ‘cintyate’ 3rd, sg. to ‘cintyete’ 3rd, dual to apply to ‘prayojane’ (two purposes) 
which I take to be dual going with both the ‘vaktṛ’ (teacher) and the ‘śrotṛ’ (student). 
150. To some extent this point was already made by Uddyotakara in the beginning of his discussion on NS 
1.1.40 but it is more clearly presented in Śabara’s commentary on MS 1.1.1. when the opponent claims, “dharma 
should be either well known or not well known. If it is well known, it need not be investigated. [While] if it is not 
well known, it cannot be investigated at all. Thus this treatment of the desire to know dharma (i.e. the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtra) is useless.” MSBh in MD, 10.1-2. dharmaḥ prasiddho vā syād aprasiddho vā. sa cet prasiddho, na 
jijñāsyaḥ. athāprasiddho, natarām. tad etad anarthakaṃ dharmajijñāsāprakaraṇam. 
151. NBṬ in NBP, 9.1-2. nanu ca prakaraṇaśravaṇāt prāg uktāny api abhidheyādīni pramāṇābhāvāt 
prekṣāvadbhir na gṛhyante, tat kimetairārambhapradeśa uktaiḥ? 
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[practically rational people] act because of that suspicion.”152 Thus, Dharmottara avoids the 
dilemma by claiming that, in such cases, people do not act because of the knowledge concerning 
the object, or lack thereof, but rather because of doubts or suspicions that something is a 
particular way. Here Dharmottara makes a point which has implications beyond what is reflected 
in pre-Jayanta Nyāya articulations of doubt, namely, that doubt is not simply a necessary 
forerunner of investigation but that it is also necessary for action. “Since, [according to 
Dharmottara,] suspicion (saṃśaya) about a desired purpose is a subordinate element for action 
for practically rational people, while suspicion (saṃśaya) about an undesired purpose is a 
subordinate element for abstaining from action.”153 According to this understanding of the action 
of ordinary people it behooves the writer of scientific treatise to relate the content and purpose of 
their composition at the very outset, i.e. in the opening sentence (ādivākya), of their work. 
Accordingly, the rational person who sees some point in learning about the texts content will 
have a suspicion as to whether or not the text succeeds and so begin reading the text. 
    While Dharmottara’s discussion of doubt in this context bears some similarities to the 
Nyāya presentation of instigating doubt or suspicion already addressed there are also important 
differences. These divergences are invaluable for our discussion of Jayanta and his potential 
sources for the deployment of doubt at the heart of all perceptual cognition and action. As 
already addressed both Jayanta and Dharmottara appeal to the concept of practically rational 
agents in the development of their arguments, a method of argument tellingly absent in both 
Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. As we have previously seen the overriding argument made by 
both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara concerning the role of doubt in the tradition of Nyāya is that 
                                                          
152. NBṬ in NBP, 9.3-4. satyam aśrute prakaraṇe kathitāny api na niścīyante. ukteṣu tv apramāṇakeṣv api 
abhidheyādiṣu saṃśaya utpadyate, saṃśayāc ca pravartante.  
153. NBṬ in NBP, 9.4-5. arthasaṃśayo 'pi hi pravṛttyaṅgam prekṣāvatām, anarthasaṃśayo 'pi nivṛttyaṅgam. 
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doubt is an essential starting point in the practice of inquiry. However, Dharmottara makes the 
stronger claim that doubt is essential not only as a forerunner to inquiry but also to action 
generally. Jayanta’s presentation of the role and nature of doubt clearly aligns him with the latter 
understanding of the term. For example, Jayanta claims that  
with regard to worldly objects, even though their validity has not been 
ascertained, people are seen engaging in the behavior of action because of 
suspicion (saṃśaya) about a desired purpose [and] in the behavior of abstaining 
from action because of suspicion (saṃśaya) about an undesired purpose.154 
As such Jayanta is building on Dharmottara’s understanding of doubt or suspicion as the 
foundation for all behavior. That is not to say that Jayanta does not uphold the Nyāya articulation 
of doubt that preceded him although he does build on and expand it. He does not limit the scope 
of doubt to the domain of investigation but rather understands it as the motivating factor in all 
activity.155 Additionally, Jayanta sees his understanding of doubt as the resting state of all 
perceptual awareness as being consistent with the Buddhist categorization of probabilistic 
knowledge as we have already seen.156 It is interesting to note that Jayanta is rather unabashed 
about his reliance on Buddhist sources. As such there is a definitive sense of acceptance in what 
Jayanta wants to say about his epistemology and his tradition in general. We may recall Jayanta’s 
incorporation of the Buddhist concept of pragmatic effectiveness (arthakriyā) as one particularly 
overt instance of this tendency but from what has been said so far it is clearly not the only piece 
of evidence we could appeal to. At this point one might be encouraged to ask whether this 
                                                          
154. Kataoka, ed. “A Critical Edition of the Prāmāṇya Section of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī,” 
511(52).7-9. dṛṣṭe viṣaye hyanirṇītaprāmāṇya evārthasaṃśayāt pravṛttirūpam anarthasaṃśayāc ca nivṛttyātmakaṃ 
vyavahāram ārabhamāṇo dṛśyate lokaḥ. 
155. We could also adequately account for the change by saying that Jayanta expands what counts as 
inquiry such that action is subsumed under the heading but this does not change the situation drastically, especially 
since Jayanta gives no hint that he sees action as inquiry while he does see doubt as preceding action. 
156. As already mentioned in Part II, this concept already seems to be reflected in the anonymous 
commentary NBṬṬ on Dharmottara’s NBṬ and so can be seen as further evidence of Jayanta’s reliance on this group 
of Buddhist texts. Part II, 52 n102. 
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marked proclivity to rely on non-Nyāya, particularly Buddhist, sources reflects a trend in 
Jayanta’s thinking towards a more accepting form of philosophy which moves beyond the more 
traditional sectarian proclivities. It is quite clear from much of what Jayanta says elsewhere in his 
text that the answer to this question should be in the negative. For example, Buddhism features 
prominently as an opponent in Jayanta’s text, so much so that he is willing to reconcile himself 
to the views of Mīmāṃsā in order to attack the tradition.157 Instead I would like to suggest that 
such open borrowing reflects Jayanta’s identity as a member of the intellectual milieu of 
Kashmir, of which Dharmottara was also a part, albeit somewhat earlier, and that this fact 
adequately accounts for his treatment of Buddhist sources. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This project began with a brief presentation of how the concept of doubt is discussed in 
the Bhagavad Gītā. The problem of doubt as we saw is not presented lightly. Doubt is an 
impediment in the path to liberation and happiness. It is clearly not a good attribute in the 
religious person and certainly should not play a role in our daily lives. The philosophic 
presentations of doubt we have addressed here are quite different. As we have seen doubt is the 
forerunner of all inquiry and, in the hands of Jayanta, the resting state of perceptual awarenesses. 
Doubt for these writers is not something to be avoided, at least not entirely. It is conceived of as 
a mundane, although sometimes important, factor in our engagements with the world and each 
other. And in the context of epistemology can provide a rather instructive role in both theorizing 
about knowledge as well as accounting for it. 
                                                          
157. Elisa Freschi & Kei Kataoka. “Jayanta on the Validity of Sacred Texts (Other than the Veda).” South 
Asian Classical Studies, 7 (2012): 5. 
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The concept of doubt is also instrumental in the trajectory of this paper; as we have seen 
it is essential to Jayanta’s rejection of Kumārila’s epistemology and effective, for our purposes, 
as a point of departure from which both Nyāya and Buddhist discussions could be assessed. As I 
stressed at the outset of this project it is my goal to be both philosophically engaged as well as 
historically conscious in my discussion of these texts and the theories they present. In this regard 
I have tried to show how the methodological commitment of Mīmāṃsā to adhere strictly to the 
way things seem in the world is essential to our understanding of Kumārila’s epistemology and 
the discussions of epistemology which preceded him. It is important, however, not to over-
emphasize the role of this methodology in determining what a follower of Mīmāṃsā could and 
could not commit themselves to. That is to say, we might be encouraged to see the tenets of a 
particular tradition in South Asia as having more influence on the members of that tradition than 
they actually did if we are not alive to the possibility of such an over-determination. In practice 
we have seen how Mīmāṃsā methodology featured differently in Śabara, the Vṛttikāra and 
Kumārila and how each employed some kind of empiricism in the formulation of their 
epistemological theories.  
A similar situation is also evident in Jayanta’s case, but even more instructively. As we 
have seen, Jayanta openly borrows from Buddhism in his discussion of epistemology on multiple 
accounts. Jayanta’s development of new methods of analysis and philosophical presentation 
indicate the rather banal fact, albeit an instructive reminder, that he is part of a complex tradition 
which includes its own philosophic, cultural, social and religious antecedents and contexts. As I 
have suggested, in Jayanta’s case it seems likely that he is more significantly influenced by his 
own historical and local context than his tradition and that this does not somehow exclude him 
from being a member of the philosophic tradition of Nyāya. This suggests that being a particular 
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member of a given tradition is not as strictly delineated as some contemporary writers have 
maintained. But we are only able to appreciate this fact by drawing out the implications of his 
discussions as well as by taking his reliance on other texts and traditions seriously. By and large 
this is the methodology that I have employed throughout this project. 
While it is obvious that different methodologies are useful for different objectives it is my 
most pressing concern to present these writers, insofar as I can, in their own right. It is blatantly 
obvious that South Asian intellectual traditions had their own standards and methods of analysis 
and to such an extent that these methodologies can be addressed they should be taken seriously 
as guidelines for approaching South Asian thought. Furthermore, it is important to recognize the 
complexity and rigor of pre-modern South Asian intellectual traditions in part as a means of 
appreciation but also as a means of instruction. Although South Asian thought, especially 
philosophy, is frequently dismissed as being theoretically soft or disproportionately interested in 
religious topics, it is my contention that the undue emphasis on the religious or metaphysical 
commitments of South Asian writers has deprived Western scholars of the opportunity to engage 
with different modes of knowledge, novel approaches to some of the classic questions of 
philosophy and the opportunity to recognize the intellectual rigor with which these writers 
engaged in theoretical discussion. 
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